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Guido Rossi 
 
The liability of the shipmaster in early modern law:  
comparative (and practice-oriented) remarks* 
 
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction (methodology in disguise) - 2. The shipmaster’s liability in civil law - 2.1 
The shipmaster as conductor - 2.2. The problem of culpa levissima - 2.3. The approach of civil law 
courts: introduction - 2.4. Culpa levissima, causality and presumptions - 2.5. Burden of proof and kind 
of mishap - 2.6. A practical note: how to prove the mishap - 3. The shipmaster’s liability in common 
law - 3.1. Carriage, bailment and strict liability - 3.2. Common carriers and culpa levissima - 4. 
Conclusion 
 
ABSTRACT: This article deals with the liability of the shipmaster in early modern law in civil and 
common law, focusing on the approach of Italian and (to a lesser extent) also Iberian courts on the 
one hand, and on that of common law courts (mostly the King’s Bench) on the other. The practice-
oriented approach is deliberate: the article seeks to understand what the actual position of the carrier 
was, not how did learned jurists classify it. Once distinguished practice from dogmatic elaborations 
(especially for the civil law), this work then proceeds to compare the rules applicable in the two 
different legal systems. Common law courts imposed strict liability on the shipmaster, for it qualified 
the common carrier as a bailee. This discouraged complex discussions on causation. In theory, civil 
law courts applied the culpa levissima of the shipmaster (qua nauta) as elaborated by the jurists. As 
such, one would be tempted to conclude for the substantial affinity of the two systems: in both, the 
shipmaster should prove vis maior or answer for the loss. In practice, however, civil law courts relied 
more on a series of presumptions of causality. As the burden of proof depended on the specific kind 
of presumption (or on its absence), the abstract standard of care counted for little. Thus, the actual 
difference between civil and common law approaches was more on causation than the standard of 
care. 
 
KEY WORDS: Shipmaster, Fault and culpa levissima, Law courts 
 
1. Introduction (methodology in disguise) 
 
This work looks at the position of early modern courts on the liability of the 
shipmaster, focusing especially on Mediterranean and English courts. The reason for 
choosing southern European case law (especially Italian, but also Castilian, Catalonian 
and Portuguese) is rather simple: unlike many northern European courts, 
Mediterranean ones often provided a reason for their decisions. Not all of them were 
bound to do so of course - suffices only to think of the greatly influential Neapolitan 
Sacro Real Consiglio and most other senates.1 But, even so, when publishing a collection 
                                                                          
* The research for this essay was conducted thanks to funding from the European Research Council 
(ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and Innovation Programme ERC Grant 
agreement No. 724544: AveTransRisk – Average - Transaction Costs and Risk Management during the First 
Globalization (Sixteenth-Eighteenth Centuries). The present contribution is meant as a preliminary study on 
the issue of vis maior and its qualification by law courts. This qualification was indeed necessary to 
establish when the rules for maritime averages could find application (see infra, § 2.6).  
  
I am especially grateful to David Ibbetson, Paul du Plessis, Peter Oestmann, Nils Jansen and Maria 
Fusaro for the helpful and stimulating discussions on culpa in early modern law and practice. All errors 
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of their decisions, the editor (typically, a judge of that court) would normally seek to 
fill the gap with his own notes on each case.2 The need of homogeneity suggested to 
exclude Venetian courts: despite the valiant efforts of some scholars to provide a 
harmonised picture of the Serenissima with the rest of Italy, its legal system remained 
remarkably sui generis at the very least until Napoleon and the Habsburgs took a close 
interest in her well being.3  
The practice-oriented approach of this work, on the other hand, probably warrants 
a few more words. While theory and practice are equally important, Continental legal 
historians have frequently focused more on the first and somehow neglected the 
second. In all probability, this was not due to any a priori assumption about their 
different importance. It just happened that most studies focused on the development 
of legal thought.4 While perhaps involuntary, however, this imbalance led many 
common lawyers to assume that one side was less important than the other: if most 
civil lawyers only looked at doctrine, they thought, then there must be a clear reason 
for this. Hence the belief, among more than a few common lawyers, that the history 
of civil law is an eminently theoretical business, much unlike the practice- and court-
based evolution of the common law itself. Perhaps a different approach of most 
civilians could have helped to avoid this. In many a subject, the reader has often the 
impression that a reasoned survey of the mainstream doctrinal literature is considered 
as sufficient. Whether such literature provides a faithful description of the way in 
which the law was actually applied does not always strike as something worth 
checking. The risk in doing so is to create an implicit presumption of symmetry 
between legal literature and legal practice: although rebuttable, such a presumption 
might have sometimes discouraged actual verification. 
In turn, this approach perhaps contributed to strengthen the perceived difference 
between civil and common law in terms of deductive vs. inductive reasoning. Thus, 
                                                                          	
remain of course my own. 
1 The duty to justify the decision applied only to the high courts shaped as rotae – and so, having 
exclusively judicial powers and, in principle, staffed with foreigners who would sit there for a short 
period, from 3 to 5 years. For a short but very informative introduction see M. Ascheri, I grandi 
tribunali, in Enciclopedia Italiana, Appendix VIII: Il contributo italiano alla storia del pensiero - Diritto, Roma 
2012, pp. 121-128. 
2 Indeed, the first printed collection of the decisions of a high court was precisely of the Neapolitan 
one, at the hands of Matthaeus de Afflictis (1447/50-c.1523), a law professor appointed to the Sacro 
Real Consiglio towards the end of his career, Mathei De Afflicto Neapolitani regii consiliarii Decisiones causarum 
Sacri Consilii Neapolitani suo tempore, In ciuitate Neapoli, per magistrum Ioannem Antonium de 
Cane<t>o Papiensem, die vltima mensis Aprilis 1509. 
3 Not to mention that the Venetian state was the only one in the Italian Peninsula without what it is 
often described as a “high court” (a central, supreme law court – not even the Avogaria di comun had 
both these features, being supreme but not properly “central”, at least in the way we would 
understand the term). The fragmentation of judicial power within a large number of different 
institutions was one of the peculiar features of the Venetian Republic. 
4 There are of course exceptions to this trend. Suffices to remember the pioneering work of G. Gorla, 
I Tribunali Supremi degli Stati italiani fra i secc. XVI e XIX, quali fattori della unificazione del diritto nello Stato e 
della sua uniformazione fra Stati (Disegno storico-comparatistico), in B. Paradisi (ed.), La formazione storica del 
diritto moderno in Europa, Firenze 1977, vol. 1, pp. 445-532. See also R. Savelli, Tribunali, “decisiones” e 
giuristi: una proposta di ritorno alle fonti, in G. Chittolini, A. Molho and P. Schiera (eds.), Origini dello Stato. 
Processi di formazione statale in Italia fra medioevo ed età moderna, Bologna 1994, pp. 397-421.  
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while the common lawyer seeks to make sense of the trend in case law by collecting, 
ordering and studying the main decisions on a given subject, the civil lawyer would 
just identify what the abstract rule at stake is, and expect to find it applied by law 
courts time and again. The perspective of the common lawyer is therefore traditionally 
described as “bottom-up”, whereas that of the civilian is usually considered to be the 
reverse. It is here that the abovementioned “presumption of symmetry” of some civil 
lawyers applies: so long as what is found “up” (in the more sophisticated legal 
literature) is not disproven, it clarifies what must have happened “down”, in the realm 
of practice. 
This might have contributed to the widespread misconception that common law 
courts followed their precedents and civil law courts did not. While neither group was 
bound to any stare decisis rule (this happened in England only after the re-organisation 
of the courts in the nineteenth century), it was the position of common law courts to 
be less consistent. This lack of rigid consistency over the centuries is obvious to the 
common lawyer – most changes in the law took place in court5 – but perhaps not 
always to the civilian. By contrast, especially in a long-term perspective, civil law courts 
were often more consistent. They built on their own jurisprudence and on that of 
other, particularly important high courts, at the very least as much as common law 
courts did. With the difference that they tended to apply the same principles in the 
same way for a remarkably longer time, without particularly significant changes either 
in procedural terms or in substantive ones. If it is difficult to find open statements 
pointing to the strength of precedents in early modern civil law courts, it is equally rare 
to find actual evidence suggesting the opposite.6  
 
Clearly, the subject is too complex to be dealt with in a few pages. I am currently 
working on a more in-depth analysis on the difference between the more theoretical 
approach of the jurists and the more practice-oriented stance of the law courts in the 
early modern period.7 This article will only seek to understand the position of early 
modern civil law on a specific subject - the maritime carrier’s liability – and compare it 
with the approach followed in the common law. Tentatively, and within this limited 
scope, the result would seem to suggest that civil law courts might have played a role 
at least as important as that of civil law jurists, possibly even more so. 
                                                                          
5 Indeed, it would be unthinkable to apply the famous saying of Henry Maine on the development of 
the common law as “gradually secreted in the interstices of procedure” beyond the Channel. H.J.S. 
Maine, Dissertations on Early Law and Custom, 1883; 2nd edn., London 1891, p. 389. 
6 A rare occasion in which this may be seen is a remark of the judges of the Florentine Civil Rota on 
the inconstancy of their Roman colleagues in the middle of the seventeenth century: “Rotam ipsam 
Romanam novis adductis legibus, aut rationibus aliquando a decisis recedere”, Selectarum Rotae 
Florentinae Decisionum Thesaurus ex Bibliotheca Iohannis Pauli Ombrosi ..., Florentiae, ex Typographia 
Bonducciana, 1784, vol. 11, dec. 11 (2.4.1655), p. 128, n. 122. This statement is interesting because 
remarkably isolated. It is precisely because courts seldom changed position that the Florentine Rota 
marvelled at the inconstancy or the Roman one. Such an inconstancy, it should be noted, was not 
about the legal principles and/or any legal term (even implied ones) in contractual obligations, but 
about their application to the specific circumstances of the case. The Florentine judges, in effect, 
marvelled at the fact that their Roman counterparts detached themselves from the older stylus of their 
own curia. 
7 G. Rossi, The Big Divide: Doctrine and Practice in Early Modern Civil Law. A Study on Fault in Case Law, 
forthcoming. 
Historia et ius - ISSN 2279-7416 www.historiaetius.eu - 12/2017 - paper 12 
 4	
Had the evolution of the common law been less conditioned by the form of 
pleading, perhaps common lawyers might have experienced the same divide between 
theory and practice in their scholarship. Be that as it may, the different attitude 
between common and civil lawyers has probably not helped to make full sense of the 
– objective – differences between the two legal systems when comparing them in their 
historical development. A more abstract approach to the history of the common law is 
unrealistic, unpractical, and especially not desirable. There could be nothing worse 
than moving from substantive, abstract ideas when examining the development of the 
common law. Further, with a very few exceptions, legal treatises appeared only 
considerably late – especially if compared with the Continent. Thus, the only way to 
have a sense of the similarities and differences between the two legal systems seems to 
be focusing more on court practice also for the Continent. Incidentally, this might 
help to get a better sense of the actual working of the legal system, and so, perhaps, it 
could prove useful even beyond the realm of comparative law. 
 
2. The shipmaster’s liability in civil law 
 
Among the Mediterranean and English approaches, it is probably easier to start 
with the first. The reason has much to do with the presence of a vast amount of 
treatises and a tradition of learned legal scholarship often not present (or at least 
nowhere near as abundant) in England during the early modern period, surely not 
before the eve of the eighteenth century at the very least. If such treatises are of great 
help to the modern scholar, however, they need to be compared with – and, typically, 
distinguished from - coeval practice. This adds a further layer not present in the 
history of the common law. To compare civil with common law on any given subject, 
it is therefore necessary to disentangle practice from doctrine in civil law first. Another 
reason to start with civil law is the mention – increasingly frequent in the King’s 
Bench during the eighteenth century – of the culpa levissima of the nauta. This has 
sometimes led Continental legal historians to envisage a link, or even a direct 
influence, between Roman law and common law on the subject. The connection 
however, as we will see, appears doubtful.  
 
2.1 The shipmaster as conductor  
 
The moment civilians and civil law courts alike began to qualify the position of the 
shipmaster with respect to the merchant consignor, they thought of locatio-conductio. 
From a legal perspective, it was the obvious choice. Further, the extreme flexibility of 
locatio-conductio - barring the odd case8 - suited well most of the features of the carrier. 
                                                                          
8 The possibility to qualify the contract of carriage in terms of locatio-conductio occasionally led the bench 
to somewhat bizarre conclusions. A (fortunately, rarely attested) one was to recognise the right of the 
shipmaster-conductor to terminate the contract when no longer economically convenient. See esp. 
Josephus Laurentius Maria de Casaregis, Discursus Legales de Commercio (2nd edn.), Venetiis, Ex 
Typographia Balleoniana, 1740, vol. 1, disc. 69, pp. 216-218 (vol. 2, pp. 216-223, in the first edition of 
1719), reporting a case where the Spanish authorities forced the ship (sailing from Leghorn to Lisbon) 
to unload most of the cargo at Majorca. As the freight was due only upon arrival and it was reckoned 
only on the cargo arrived at destination, the shipmaster found more convenient to terminate the 
charter-party, discharge also the remaining part of the cargo at Majorca and look for new customers. 
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While there was little doubt that the shipmaster should be qualified as a conductor, 
however, not many early modern works on locatio-conductio dealt with his liability. Let us 
take for instance the influential treatise of Vincentius Carocius (Vincenzo Carocci, 
1547-1623), published in 1584.9 Throughout the entire work, only twice does Carocius 
venture into maritime affairs. The first and main case is the legal qualification of the 
hiring out of the whole vessel.10 The other is the undertaking to ferry a mule that dies 
while on the boat, the whole question focusing on whether the ferryman (as conductor) 
should receive payment.11 What is conspicuous is the absence of the shipmaster. The 
reason is obvious enough: in Carocius’ times, the reader would have expected a good 
locatio-conductio treatise to deal with land and chattels. Carocius is hardly an isolated 
case: fifty years later, for instance, the (extremely meticulous) locatio-conductio treatise of 
Thomas Maulius does not mention a single time the carrier.12 Again, almost fifty years 
after Maulius, nothing can be found in the similar treatise of Petrus Pacionus (Pietro 
Pacioni) either.13 Sea-transport was a business for merchants, and it seems rather 
significant that coeval works specifically devoted on insurance made on the contrary 
abundant (and even excessive) use of the locatio-conductio scheme.14 Learned jurists were 
                                                                          	
When sued by the merchant, the Rota of Florence found for the shipmaster: “Considerandum insuper 
est, quod de natura contractus naulizationis tacita in eo inest conditio, videlicet si Capitaneus absque 
ullo impedimento poterit vehere merces, et sic omne pactum, et obligatio, quam possit pro obiecto 
habere res variabilis, numquam alterat illam mutabilitatem proveniente ex propria natura rei variabilis, 
et sicuti suapte natura ista res est variabilis, ita hac variata variatur etiam, imo dissolvitur obligatio ... 
cum itaque natura transuectionis mercium destinatarum a contrahentibus ad certum locum sit 
variabilis, ita variata destinatione transuectionis mercium remanet per consequens variata etiam 
obligatio Capitanei progrediendi suum iter, et vehendi merces ad locum destinatum. Et quamvis 
videatur hoc argumentum solummodo concludere in eo casu, in quo mutatio sequeretur in omnibus 
partibus contractus, respondetur mutationem status rerum secutam in una parte tantum similiter 
operari in contractibus, quam illam mutationem integre secutam in omnibus eorumdem partibus ... 
Nihilque officeret oppositio, quod semper naulizator utique soluturus fuisset omnem naulorum 
quantitatem in contractu naulizationis promissam non obstante exoneratione majoris partis mercium 
secutae in Portu Maone. Quia facile responsio in promptu est, nam quotiescumque naulizationis 
contractus propter aliquem inopinatum eventum de jure resolvitur, contrahentes statim liberantur ab 
obligatione primae naulizationis, et ad stabilendum novum contractum novus requiritur, et reciprocus 
Partium consensus, quo rursus naulizator se soluturum spondeat idem naulum ab initio promissum pro 
itu, et reditu navis, et rursus Capitaneus eodem consensu primaevam suam obligationem assumat. 
Quare hoc non secuto poterant utique contrahentes agere quod magis ipsis lubebat, aliter Capitaneus 
post inopinatam mercium exonerationem in Portu Maone prosequendo iter debebat omnino 
dependere a voluntate naulizatoris circa approbationem continuationis itineris. ... Et quando quis in 
casu non praeviso se gerit, ut probabiliter se gessisset ejus Dominus, liberatur ab omni damno, et 
culpa” (ibid., p. 217, n. 8-10 and 15; vol. 2, pp. 104-105 in the 1719 edition). 
9 Tractatvs Locati et Condvcti ... D. Vincentio Carocio ... Auctore ..., Venetiis, 1584, apud Lucianum Pasinum, 
et Marcum Amadorum. 
10 Ibid., pt. 2, s.v. Naulo, fol. 38r. 
11 Ibid, pt. 2, s.v. ad l. Rhodia de iactu, fol. 50r-v. 
12 Thomae Mavli ... Tractatus solvtissimvs de Locatione et Conductione ..., Francofurtii ad Moenum, apud 
Ioannem Fridericvm Weissivm, 1633. 
13 Petri Pacioni ... De Locatione et Condvctione Tractatvs ..., Romae, Typis et Sumptibus Nicolai Angeli 
Tinassij, 1677. 
14 Cf. on the point G. Rossi, Civilians and insurance: approximations of reality to the law, 83 (2015), Tijdschrift 
voor Rechtsgeschiedenis, pp. 323-364. 
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not the only ones to pay little attention to sea-carriage in more general works. It is not 
frequent to find decisions of law courts dealing with maritime transport before the late 
sixteenth century either. Even then, their number (at least judging on the basis of 
published collections) was rather limited. Only during the seventeenth century 
(especially its second half) did law courts begin to issue an increasing number of 
decisions on the subject. 
Qualifying the carrier as conductor did not pose particular problems (at least in 
principle) with regard to casus fortuitus: it fell beyond the liability of the shipmaster15 - 
just as any other conductor.16 Nor is the shipmaster liable for the mishap imputable to 
the merchant, just as the conductor does not answer for the loss or damage imputable to 
the locator even if he undertook to cover any casus fortuitus.17 The most problematic 
feature was that of the standard of care of the shipmaster-conductor. 
To get a sense of the position of civil law courts on the conductor’s liability, three 
elements must be briefly mentioned: the degree of fault required to trigger liability, the 
causation link between fault and damage, and - especially - the system of presumptions 
used by the courts. The three points, as we shall see, are deeply related to each other. 
Among the plethora of early modern forensic manuals, we will make frequent use of 
that of Emanuel Alvarez Pegas (c.1526-1583)18 - both because very well known (and 
often relied upon by the bench) and especially since, in all probability, it is the most 
complete on issues of fault. 
 
2.2. The problem of culpa levissima 
 
The many different facets of liability found in the Justinianic compilation led to an 
even larger number of definitions of fault in medieval learned law. In principle, such 
                                                                          
15 Gasparis Antonii Thesavri I.C. Tavrinensis, ... Quaestionvm Forensivm, Libri Duo Posteriores, Avgvstae 
Tavrinorvm, apud HH. Io. Dominici Tarini, 1619, lib. 3, q. 79, p. 65, n. 2: “locator [i.e. the merchant 
consignor] tenetur de damno conductori illato ab eo cui resisti nullo modo potest ... periculum casus 
fortuiti in re, seu fructibus rei locatae contingens spectat ad locatorem” (decision of the Piedmont 
Senate, 19.9.1611). 
16 See for instance, among the many examples that could be given, an interesting case of the late 1580s 
about tax-collecting rights which the Apostolic Chamber farmed out, and which were subsequently 
sub-contracted for specific towns to third parties. The sub-contracting mechanism was described in 
locatio-conductio terms, and so the moment that famine broke out in those towns, the sub-contractor - as 
conductor - obtained a reduction in the price previously agreed upon from the main contractor-locator. In 
turn, the latter was able to obtain a similar reduction of the original price from the Apostolic Chamber 
because himself was to be considered conductor and the Chamber locator. The case is reported in Jacopo 
Menochio (1532-1607), Iacobi Menochii ... Consiliorvm sive Responsorvm, Francofvrti ad Moenvm, Typis et 
sumptibus Wechelianorum, apud Danielem et Dauidem aubrios et Clementem Schleichium, 1625, vol. 
9, cons. 835, esp. p. 132, n. 13.  
17 E.g. Practicarvm Conclvsionvm Ivris … Dominici TT. S. Onvphrii S.R.E. Presbyt. Card. Tvschi (3rd edn.), 
Lvdgvni, ex Officina Ioannis Pillehotte, Sumpt. Ioannis Caffin, et Francisci Plaignard, 1634, vol. 3, 
concl. 430, p. 576, n. 35 and 37: “conductor … susceperit in se omnes casus fortuitos … non tenetur 
de casu proveniente facto locatoris … Extende, vt procedat etiam quando casus, qui interuenit, potuit 
praeuideri, et obiuari a locator; quia si culpa locatoris prouenit, nedum conductor, qui suscepit omnem 
casum fortuitum, debet consequi omne damnum, et interesse”. 
18 Emmanuelis Alvarez Pegas ... Resolutiones forenses practicabiles ..., pt. 1, Vlyssipone, Ex Typographia 
Michaelis Deslandes, Sumptibus, et expensis Amtonij Leyte Pereyra, 1682. 
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definitions envisaged different degrees of liability.19 The reluctance to speak openly of 
strict liability led medieval jurists to elaborate a liability system almost entirely based 
on fault. This, coupled with a soft spot for symmetry, led to a series of sub-divisions 
of fault, whose precise number sometimes changed from an author to the other. By 
the time of the early commentators, the scheme accepted by many jurists 
encompassed six different categories - three for aggravated fault and three for lesser 
fault.20 The most important and successful (basic) division was the tripartition of culpa 
into lata, levis and levissima, on the basis of the degree of fault necessary to trigger 
liability. So, for culpa lata, a remarkably high degree of fault was requested – so high to 
verge on fraud. By contrast, a very low degree of fault sufficed to trigger liability in 
case of culpa levis, and an even lower degree would do for culpa levissima. The default 
standard was that of culpa levis. At least, this is how medieval civilians interpreted 
ordinary culpa, unless doing as much would have clashed with some specific Roman 
law texts or with the more general principle of utility.21  
The main reference in the sources for culpa levis is D.9.2.31, pointing to what a 
diligent person could have foreseen. While some jurists sticked to that (average) 
diligence for culpa levis,22 the standard interpretation of culpa levis came however to 
highlight that diligence, making the bonus paterfamilias an extremely vigilant person.23 
This way, culpa levis in abstracto came to entail a remarkably high standard of care. 
Locatio-conductio was no exception to this approach (on the contrary, it was a good 
application of the utility principle)24 and so, as a general rule, the conductor was 
subjected to the (very high) standard of care of culpa levis.25 As such, the conductor would 
                                                                          
19 A clear summary may be found in J. Hallebeek, Negligence in Medieval Roman Law, in E.H. Schrage 
(ed.), Negligence. The Comparative Legal History of the Law of Torts, Berlin 2001, pp. 73-100, esp. 74-79. 
20 That was particularly the case from the early commentators, at least from Bartolus de Sassoferrato 
and then Bartholomaeus de Saliceto. For the sake of symmetry, they opposed culpa latior (lying mid-way 
between latissima and lata) to culpa levior (placed between levis and levissima). While culpa latior had some – 
vague – foothold in the sources (mainly D.16.3.32), culpa levior had none. Cf. H.-J. Hoffmann, Die 
Abstufung der Fahrlässigkeit in der Rechtsgeschichte, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der culpa levissima, Berlin 
1968, pp. 51-52. 
21 Cf. Hallebeek (note 19), p. 77. 
22 Such as Juan Yañes Parladorio: “Levem itaque culpam communis diligentia excludit: leuissimam vero 
nonnisi maxima diligentia”, Ioannis Yanez Parladorii ..., Quotidianarum differentiarum Sesquicenturia ..., 
Matriti, apud Ioannem de la Cuesta, 1612, diff. 132, p. 422, n. 12. Cf. Casaregis, Discursus Legales de 
Commercio (note 8), vol. 2, disc. 122, p. 4, n. 8: “levis culpa est negligentia eorum quae ab homine 
mediocriter diligenti ejusdem conditionis, ac professionis omitti non solent”. 
23 E.g. Hallebeek (note 19), pp. 77-78. 
24 In effect, looking at the Roman law sources on locatio-conductio, two texts used the word diligentissimus: 
D.19.2.25.7 and Inst.3.24.5. The point led to some discussion among medieval jurists: cf. Hallebeek 
(note 19), pp. 88-89. 
25 Pegas, Resolutiones forenses practicabiles (note 18), vol. 1, cap. 3, p. 120, n. 250: “Sexto infertur in 
contractu locationis, et conductionis ad inuicem contrahentes teneri, non solum de dolo, sed etiam de 
lata, et leui culpa, ex eo quia in gratiam vtriusque celebratur”. Cf. Josephus Mascardus (Giuseppe 
Mascardi, c.1540-c.1585), Josephi Mascardi ..., Conclusiones Probationum Omnivm Qvibusvis in vtroque Foro 
versantibus ..., Francofvrti, Impensis Joan. Syberti Heyl, Typis Nicolai Kuchenbeckeri, 1661, vol. 3, 
concl. 997, p. 43, n. 1; Anacletus Reiffenstuel, Jus canonicum universum clara methodo juxta titulos quinque 
librorum decretalium ... dilucidatum, Venetiis, apud Antonium Bortoli, 1742, vol. 3, pp. 266-7, n. 60. There 
would be little point in listing the (printed) decisions where the conductor was found to be liable for culpa 
levis, for their number is very large. Among the most clear ones on the point see however Sacrae Rotae 
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be liable if his conduct were to fall short of a remarkably high level diligence. But, at 
least in principle, it would be up to the locator to prove as much.26 This seems to be a 
rule universally shared by early modern courts, as well as by the vast majority of 
jurists.27  
 
The contract of carriage, we have seen, falls within the locatio-conductio scheme. The 
shipmaster is therefore a conductor. But his liability goes beyond that of culpa levis: it is 
culpa levissima.28 In early modern ius commune it is not easy to find culpa levissima as a 
general standard of care. Sometimes it was invoked for particular kinds of people, 
such as those whom we would consider senior civil servants.29 By and large, however, 
the main situation where culpa levissima applied was that of few specific kinds of 
conductores: nautae, caupones and stabularii. In the Digest, the undertaking of 
shipmasters,30 inn- and stable-keepers to vouch for their customers’ goods while on 
the ship or the premises was clearly framed in terms of strict liability: they would 
answer ‘etiam sine culpa’, unless the mishap was due to vis maior.31 In order to bring 
                                                                          	
Romanae Decisiones coram R.P.D. Alexandro Lvdowisio nvnc S.mo D.N. Gregorio XV ..., Coloniae Agrippinae, 
apud Ioannem Gymnicum, 1623, dec. 528 (14.4.1613), p. 743, n. 8. See also Sacrae Rotae Romanae 
Decisionvm Recentiorvm a Pavlo Rvbeo I.C. Romano selectarum, Romae, apud Paulum Balleonium, 1716, vol. 
12 (1655-1658), dec. 159, p. 229, n. 24. 
26 Juan Pedro Fontanella, Decisiones Sacri Regii Senatus Cathaloniae avthore Ioh. Petro Fontanella ..., Genevae, 
Sumptibus Samuelis Chouët, 1662, vol. 2, dec. 533, p. 503, n. 10, and dec. 535, p. 506, n. 8.  
27 Cp. the – remarkably isolated – position of Ripoll, infra, note 49. 
28 E.g. Pegas, Resolutiones forenses practicabiles (note 18), vol. 1, cap. 3, p. 126, n. 321: “Septimo infertur in 
magistro nauis, quia non solum tenetur de dolo, sed etiam de culpa lata, leui, et leuissima”. 
29 See for instance a decision of the Florentine Rota reported in Josephi Urceoli ... Decisiones Inclytae Rotae 
Florentinae, Coloniae Allobrogium, sumptibus Fratrum de Tournes, 1732, dec. 21 (5.11.1676), p. 116, n. 
12: “ille, qui officium et munus aliquod administrandum, et gerendum suscipit, is omnem culpam 
subire tenetur ... maxime hoc verum dicit, quando officium, et munus est valde grave, in quo magna 
hominis fides, et prudentia requiritur.” In early modern case law it is fairly frequent (or at least not 
particularly rare) to find cases clearly pointing to the culpa levissima of high officials. On a practical level, 
apart from the theoretical justification provided in the decision above, the reason for this might have 
something to do with the fact that those officers were often entrusted with money – whether 
collecting, distributing, moving or watching after them. The prima facie similarity with the common law 
on the point is tenuous at best. So for instance in his classic study Winfield groups together certain 
categories of persons as being under a duty of care “arising from a public calling” (P. Winfield, Duty in 
Tortious Negligence, XLI (1934) Columbia Law Review, pp. 41-66, at 44), but that public calling is in effect 
almost the opposite as the position of higher officials in civil law. The perspective is almost inverted: 
the “public calling” at common law implies a bottom-up approach: anyone who deals with someone 
exercising those specific professions is entitled to rely on their expertise. By contrast, in civil law the 
approach is closer to a top-bottom one: the commonwealth (more often, the prince) entrusts specific 
persons with tasks of great importance.  
30 The deep institutional and economic differences of the Roman and late-medieval contexts make 
comparisons between nautae and shipmasters somewhat fragile. As to the other members of the crew, 
occasional mentions may be found among learned jurists, but mainly with regard to the vicarious 
liability of the shipmaster for culpa in eligendo. But even in that context the aggravated liability was only 
of the shipmaster. 
31 D.4.9.3.1 (Ulp. 14 ed.): “…at hoc edicto omnimodo qui receperit tenetur, etiam si sine culpa eius res 
periit vel damnum datum est, nisi si quid damno fatali contingit. Inde Labeo scribit, si quid naufragio 
aut per vim piratarum perierit, non esse iniquum exceptionem ei dari. Idem erit dicendum et si in 
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this kind of liability within the language of fault, medieval jurists resorted to the 
standard of culpa levissima.32 To say that they soon reached unanimous views as to its 
actual meaning would be inaccurate.33 But, progressively, some consensus was reached 
on the fact that - at least in principle - the liability for culpa levissima was not strict. The 
problem was to make sense of what exactly this culpa levissima was. 
The traditional explanation for the aggravated liability of shipmasters (as well as for 
inn- and stable-keepers) was a sort of presumption of dishonesty. Roman law made no 
mystery of considering nautae as base and mean people, hence the most plausible 
explanation for the damage or loss was that they caused it. Their aggravated liability 
was thus viewed as an exception to the default rule in locatio-conductio, which the 
Romans thought necessary so as to protect the locator from the mischief of those 
particularly base categories of conductores.34 The Accursian Gloss accepted this 
presumption,35 and later jurists did not oppose much resistence, perhaps also because 
the explanation relieved them from providing other (and more legally-focused) 
reasons for the selective imposition of culpa levissima to specific categories of conductores. 
                                                                          	
stabulo aut in caupona vis maior contigerit.” D.4.9.5pr in particular stated that the same shipmasters, 
inn- and stable-keepers are charged with custodia of the cargo, although they do not receive additional 
consideration to assume strict liability (“Nauta et caupo et stabularius mercedem accipiunt non pro 
custodia ... et tamen custodiae nomine tenentur”). 
32 E.g. R. Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations. Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition, Oxford 1996, 
pp. 524-5. See further the same Zimmermann, Die Geschichte der Gastwirtschaftung in Deutschland, in H.-P. 
Haferkamp and T. Repgen (eds.), Usus modernus pandectarum. Römisches Recht, deutsches Recht und Naturrecht 
in der frühen Neuzeit, Cologne-Weimar-Vienna 2007, pp. 271-339 at 274-288. While the Gloss was clear 
in considering the peculiar liability of nautae, caupones and stabularii as an exception to the default 
position of locatio-conductio rule (e.g. Gloss ad D.4.9.5pr, § Tenentur, Digestvm Vetvs sev Pandectarvm Ivris 
Civilis, Parisiis, apud Gulielmum Merlin, 1566, vol. 1, col. 667: “et sic de leui culpa, si agitur locati. At 
hic de leuissima”), it also made sure to highlight that the exception could not be considered as 
introducing strict liability in locatio-conductio either. Without some degree of fault, no conductor is liable 
(Gloss ad D.4.9.3.1, § Etiam si sine culpa, ibid., cols. 664-665: “Scilicet leui. Leuissima tamen interuenit. 
Nam si nec leuissima interuenit, ergo fuit casus fortuitus, et sic non tenetur”). Culpa levissima was still 
considered a fault-based criterion, incompatible - on a substantive level - with strict liability (Gloss ad 
D.4.9.3.1, § Etiam si sine culpa, ibid., col. 665: “nam inter leuissimam culpam, et casum fortuitum, nihil 
est medium”). Cf. Baldus, ad D.4.9.3.1, § Ex hoc edicto (Baldi Vbaldi Pervsini ... In Primam Digesti Veteris 
Partem Commentaria ... Venetiis [apud Iuntas], 1577, fol. 269v, n. 3). 
33 See first of all D. Maffei, Caso fortuito e responsabilita contrattuale nell’eta dei glossatori, Milano 1957, esp. 
pp. 23-27. Cf. further H.-J. Hoffmann (note 20), pp. 35-38; H. Lange, Schadensersatz und Privatstrafe in der 
mittelalterlichen Rechtstheorie, Münster-Köln 1955, esp. pp. 120-121. 
Among the glossators, the utility principle was invoked to explain culpa levissima in some, specific cases 
(on which see H.-J. Hoffmann (note 20), p. 42). Failing that, as in the case of locatio-conductio, some 
alternative explanations were tentatively provided (ibid., pp. 47-48 and 65). Cf. also H. Dilcher, Die 
Theorie der Leistungsstörungen bei Glossatoren, Kommentatoren und Kanonisten, Frankfurt-am-Main 1960, pp. 
74-90; W. Engelmann, Die Schuldlehre der Postglossatoren und ihre Fortentwicklung, Aalen 1965, pp. 6-7. 
34 For instance, in his comment on the strict liability of nautae, caupones and stabularii Ulpian stated 
openly as much, and did not hide his bias against them: cf. D.4.9.1.1. 
35 Gloss, casus ad D.4.9.1pr, § Maxima (Digestvm Vetvs, sev Pandectarvm Ivris Civilis (note 32), vol. 1, col. 
661): “Dicit Vlpia[nus] quod maxima et vtilitas huius edicti: quia nautae, cau[pones] stabularij 
surripiebant olim omnia, et associabant se furibus, et etiam post hoc edictum huiusmodi flagitiis non 
abstinebant: vnde statuit hoc edictum vt tollantur fures, et eorum malitiis obuietur, et vt etiam 
puniantur: cum sit in ipsorum arbitrio vt eos non recipiant.” 
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Not all the “usual suspects” followed the Gloss though. Bartolus for instance did not 
(and it might not be fortuitous that his stance on the aggravated probatory position of 
those categories seems to betray some uneasiness).36 But Baldus did, and in so doing 
he greatly contributed to the crystallisation of this “presumption of dishonesty”. More 
specifically, Baldus reported - approvingly - the position of Nicolaus de Mattarellis 
(Niccolò Mattarelli, 1240-ante 1314), who explained the inversion of the burden of 
proof for nautae, caupones and stabularii with their typical malice.37 By the late sixteenth 
and early seventeenth century, jurists had little doubt as to the veracity of Gloss on the 
point. In his famed Poli ́tica para corregidores, Jerónimo Castillo de Bobadilla (c.1547-
1605) for instance praised the wisdom of that “ancient law”, introduced to protect the 
locator from the mischief of those particularly nasty kinds of conductores.38 The same 
argument is to be found, among many other jurists, also in Pegas: the reason why the 
nautae (together with the other two categories) are under culpa levissima is “to curb their 
malice”.39 
Writers of maritime law inherited this position. As they worked within the ius 
commune framework, they could not detach themselves from it. What they could do 
was to provide a different and less biased explanation for the aggravated liability, 
although they were probably conscious of its inner ambiguity. So for instance 
Benvenuto Stracca (1509–1578) explained the culpa levissima of the shipmaster with the 
fact that he was chosen for his skills.40 The argument remains weak: it would have 
made sense if it applied to the sea-carrier as much as the land-carrier - but it did not. 
Similarly, both Juan de Hevia Bolaño (c.1570-c.1623) and Franciscus Roccus 
(Francesco Rocco, 1605-1676) stated that the shipmaster was liable for culpa levissima 
because he owed “exactissima diligentia”.41 Again, the explanation is circular (owing 
exactissima diligentia is another way of saying that one is answerable for culpa levissima), 
and it does not clarify why such a standard was imposed on the sea-carrier alone. 
                                                                          
36 See esp. Bartolus’ (short) commentary on D.4.9, esp. ad D.4.9.3 (Bartoli a Saxoferrato, in Primam Digesti 
Veteris Partem Commentaria … Basileae, ex Officina Episcopiana, 1588, p. 486). Cp. however his 
comment on D.19.2.55pr, § Dominus horreum (Id., in Secundam Digesti Veteris Partem Commentaria, ibid., p. 
409, n. 1). 
37 “[P]ropter eorum ... malitiam vt teneantur nisi quando probent casum”, Baldus, ad C.4.65.1, § Ominus 
(Baldi de Pervsio Ivrisconsvlti clarissimi, svper Quarto, et Quinto Codicis Iust[iniani] lib[ris] Commentaria 
luculentissima ... Lvdgvni [typis Gaspar & Melchior Trechsel], 1539, fol. 132rb, n. 3). Baldus approved, 
especially with regard to caupones, “quia communiter sunt homines vulgares et rapaces” (ibid.). 
38 Jerónimo Castillo de Bobadilla, Poli ́tica para corregidores y señores de vasallo ... Barcelona, Por Sebastian de 
Cormellas y à su costa, 1624, vol. 2, lib. 3, cap. 4, p. 88, n. 92. 
39 “[V]t refrenetur praedictorum malitia”. Pegas, Resolutiones forenses practicabiles (note 18), vol. 1, cap. 3, 
p. 123, n. 284. 
40 Benvenutus Stracca, Clarissimi Ivrisc. Benvenvti Stracchae ..., De Assecurationibus, Tractatus ..., Venetiis, 
1569, gl. 15, fol. 104v, n. 7-8. Cf. the same Stracca, de Nautis, in Id., Tractatvs Clariss. Ivrisconsvlti Benvenvti 
Stracchae Anconitani, de Nautis, Nauibus, et Nauigatione, Coloniae Agrippinae, apud Viduam ioannis 
Gymnici, 1599, pt. 2, p. 244, n. 4. 
41 Juan de Hevia Bolaño, Laberinto de Comercio Terrestre y Naval … avtor Ivan de Hevia Bolaño …, Madrid, 
por Luis Sanchez … a su costa, y de Geronimo de Courbes, 1619, lib. 3, cap. 12, p. 634, n. 30; 
Franciscus Roccus, De Navibus et Navlo, in Id., Responsorum legalium cum decisionibus centuria secunda ac 
mercatorum notabilia in sex titulos distributa, Neapoli, ex Typographia Lucae Antonij Fusci, sumptibus 
Iacobi Antonii Bagnuli, 1655, not. 9, p. 364, n. 22. 
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Almost a century later, Josephus Laurentius Maria de Casaregis (Giuseppe Lorenzo 
Maria Casaregis, 1670-1737) motivated the culpa levissima of the shipmaster with the 
fact that he was paid for his job42 - as if any other conductor worked for free.  
The truth is that there was no clear reason why only the sea-carrier should be 
saddled with that very stringent standard of care. No jurist writing on maritime 
commerce mentioned the classical presumption of dishonesty, but none of them could 
find a different reason for the aggravated standard either. Nor is it likely to imagine 
that jurists sought to provide a theoretical basis for the coeval mercantile practice, 
which was quite the opposite. 
 
The root of most problems on culpa levissima lies in the very thin margin between 
culpa levis and strict liability. Culpa in essence is the deviation from a certain standard. 
Raising the standard of culpa levis to the highest degree of care effectively meant 
pushing that of culpa levissima beyond fault. The most widespread explanation of culpa 
levissima was that shared also by Bartolus: a deviation from the taxing diligence of the 
most diligent men of the same condition and profession as the defendant.43 Culpa 
levissima would thus differ from culpa levis in that it referred to the standard of care 
(theoretically) ascribed to the most diligent and prudent persons exercising the same 
profession as the defendant, whereas the standard of culpa levis looked “just” at the 
standard ascribed to very diligent and prudent men of the same condition as the 
defendant.44 
                                                                          
42 Casaregis, Discursus Legales de Commercio (note 8), vol. 1, disc. 19, p. 53, n. 33 (vol. 1, p. 102, in the 
1719 edition): “quinmo attenta ea mercede, seu naulo mercium, quod solvitur Magistro, iste non solum 
de levi culpa, sed etiam de levissima”. Cf. also ibid., vol. 1, disc. 46, p. 148, n. 3 (vol. 1, p. 285, in the 
first edition of 1719). Although debatable, the position was not extravagant. Some courts were inclined 
to qualify even a mandate as entailing culpa levissima if remunerated (e.g. Decisiones Rotae Florentinae 
Authore Martio Venturini ..., Florentiae, Typis Regiae Celsitudinis, apud Antonium Mariam Albizzini, 
1709, dec. 45, p. 318, n. 24). Perhaps the rationale of such positions might have been that both 
mandatee and conductor were carrying out an opus and it was their responsibility to bring it to 
conclusion. The same Casaregis was very clear that culpa levissima did not apply to the locator operarum: 
Casaregis, Discursus Legales de Commercio (note 8), vol. 1, disc. 36, p. 119, n. 21 (vol. 1, p. 230, in the first 
edition of 1719). 
43 Bartolus, repetitio ad D.16.3.32, in Secundam Digesti Veteris Partem Commentaria (note 36), p. 324, n. 27: 
“Leuissima culpa est deuiatio incircumspecta ab ea diligentia, quam habent homines diligentes et 
diligentissimi, eiusdem conditionis et professionis.” Cf. e.g. H.-J. Hoffmann (note 20), p. 50 
44 Bartolus noted how other definitions of culpa levis were exceedingly broad, and therefore also 
encompassing culpa levissima. To avoid that, he provided a somewhat more elaborate definition, 
according to whether the object of damage or loss was did not belong to the defendant or on the 
contrary its ownership was shared between plaintiff and defendant. Yet his main definition – on the 
damage to property not belonging to the defendant – was almost just as broad as that he criticised. 
Bartolus, repetitio ad D.16.3.32, in Secundam Digesti Veteris Partem Commentaria (note 36), p. 324, n. 26: 
“Petrus [scil., de Bellapertica] uero sic diffinit: Leuis culpa, est negligentia, quae non in magna fatuitate 
consistit, sed in eo quod aliquis minorem diligentiam adhibet, quam secundum communem naturam 
hominum diligentium et diligentissimorum adhiberi debuit: nec allegat iura. Ista diffinitio est … falsa in 
eo quod dicit, hominum diligentium, etc. Nam ista est leuissima culpa … Qualiter ergo diffiniemus? 
Mihi uidetur, quod leuis culpa ueniat tripliciter consideranda. Nam leuis culpa assumitur aliter in rebus 
prorsus alienis, aliter sumitur in rebus communibus incidenter, aliter in rebus communib(us) ex 
conuentione. Et sic triplicem diffinitionem requirit. Ad primum dico, quod leuis culpa in rebus alienis, est 
deuiatio incircumspecta ab ea diligentia, quam adhibent homines diligentes eiusdem conditionis et professionis …” 
(emphasis added).  
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In its essence, the Bartolian distinction was just a question of grammar: superlative 
trumps intensifier. So, in theory, “highly diligent” is not exactly the same as “the most 
diligent”. But on a practical level the difference is preciously thin, all the more since 
the standard, as said, is in abstracto, and so “the most diligent” conveys the idea of 
someone, in effect, just highly diligent. When it came to applying the concept of culpa 
levissima, therefore, this distinction (amounting to being “more diligent than diligent”)45 
was virtually useless. Treating culpa levissima as actual fault but keeping it distinct from 
culpa levis would have meant looking at what someone suffering from obsessive-
compulsive disorder would have done to make sure that nothing could possibly go 
wrong.46 In practice, there was no further degree of fault beyond culpa levis.47 
A different way of justifying culpa levissima (but not to explain it in practice), rather 
widespread among early modern civilians and civil law courts alike, was playing with 
the different gravity between omission and commission. Within culpa levis, it was 
generally acknowledged that faulty omissions (culpa in omittendo or in non faciendo) were 
somewhat less serious than faulty commissions (culpa in committendo or in faciendo).48 On 
that basis, it was possible to explain culpa levissima in faciendo as lying on the same level 
of blameworthiness as culpa levis in omittendo. Since omissions resulting in culpa levis were 
punishable, condemning the defendant for culpa levissima in faciendo could be construed 
in fault-based terms as well.49 This approach, however, could explain in terms of fault 
                                                                          	
Moving towards the early modern period, see inter multos Alphonsus Alvarez Guerrero, Thesavrvs 
Christianae Religionis ... Florentiae, apud Filios Laurentii Torrentini, 1563, p. 435: “… leuis culpa est 
secundum Bar(tolum) in l. quod nerua ff. depositi (D.16.3.32) deuiatio incircumspecta ab ea diligentia 
quam communiter habent omnes qui sunt eiusdem conditionibus et professionibus … leuissima culpa 
est deuiatio incircumspecta ab alia diligentia quam adhiberent diligentiores et diligentissimi eiusdem 
conditionis et professionis”, and Pegas, Resolutiones forenses practicabiles (note 18), vol. 1, cap. 3, p. 100, n. 
75-76: “Leuis culpa est deuiatio ab ea diligentia, quam adhibere solent homines diligentissimi ejusdem 
conditionis … leuissima culpa est deuiatio circunspecta, ab ea diligentia, quam habent omnes 
diligentissimi ejusdem professionis”.  
45 R. Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations (note 32), p. 192. 
46 This in effect seems to be the ironical description of Heineccius: see N. Jansen, The development of legal 
doctrine in Europe. Extracontractual liability for fault, in Id. (ed.), The Development and Making of Legal Doctrine, 
Cambridge 2010, pp. 1-45, at 7, text and notes 33-34. 
47 All the more with the introduction of culpa levior: supra, note 20. 
48 E.g., with specific reference to our subject, Stracca, De Assecurationibus (note 40), gl. 15, fol. 103r, n. 4. 
49 See e.g. the decision of the Roman Rota of 3.6.1613 on the case of a shipmaster who decided to 
enter the port despite a storm approaching: R.P.D. Matthaei Bvratti ... Decisiones, Lvdgvni, Sumpt. 
Ioannis-Antonii Hvgvetan et Marci-Antonii Ravavd, 1661, vol. 1, dec. 493, p. 433, n. 4. The culpa levis 
in non faciendo obviously consisted in that the ship could have changed her course instead of entering 
the port. Interestingly enough, the court qualified the behaviour of the shipmaster as culpa levissima in 
faciendo despite the fact that it clearly resulted from the evidence that the pilot had strongly insisted to 
change course (ibid., p. 433, n. 4 and 8). That might have probably sufficed to “upgrade” the degree of 
fault of the shipmaster, given his recklessness, and qualify his behaviour (at the very least) as culpa levis.  
Only very few jurists invoked the equivalence between culpa levis (in omittendo) with culpa levissima (in 
committendo), so as to saddle the ordinary conductor with culpa levissima (and so, inverting the normal 
burden of proof): see esp. Acacius de Ripoll, Acacii Antonii De Ripoll ... Variae iuris resolutiones ..., 
Lvdgvni, Sumptibus Iacobi, Andreae, et Matthaei Prost, 1630, cap. 12, p. 392, n. 129-130. In effect, 
Ripoll sought – unsuccessfully – to argue for the generalised application of the standard of culpa 
levissima to any conductor: ibid., cap. 12, p. 400, n. 245-248. Ripoll’s position, it should be noted, was 
severely reprimanded not only by other jurists, but especially by the courts. See esp. Fontanella, 
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only the liability for positive actions resulting in culpa levissima, but not also that for 
omissions.50 And omissions, it should be noted, accounted for most cases of culpa 
levissima in practice.  
At this point, the obvious thing to do would be concluding that culpa levissima was 
just culpa levis with an inversion in the burden of proof. In other words, under culpa 
levissima the defendant might have been still under culpa levis, with the difference that it 
was up to him to prove that he met that standard - not to the plaintiff to disprove as 
much. Especially for omissions, the combination of the very high standard of care of 
culpa levis and the obvious difficulty in proving a negative would have meant that, while 
framed in the language of fault, culpa levissima amounted to strict liability.  
Interpreting culpa levissima as the culpa levis presumptively saddled on the defendant 
would find some confirmation, although somewhat limited, among early modern 
authors.51 It would also fit well with the position of ordinary conductores (i.e., apart from 
the case of nautae, stabularii and cauponii). A “normal” conductor becomes liable for culpa 
levissima only if he specifically undertakes to keep the thing safe. In such a case, the 
standard of care is higher because the conductor receives additional remuneration to 
vouch for the safety of the thing.52 Hence law courts inferred from a conspicuously 
higher payment than usual the voluntary acceptance of culpa levissima.53 The point is 
important for two reasons. First, because it justifies the higher standard of care with a 
                                                                          	
Decisiones Sacri Regii Senatus Cathaloniae (note 26), vol. 2, dec. 533, p. 503, n. 10. 
50 Under this approach, omissions were considered as relevant for liability purposes only if falling 
within culpa levis. For considering omissions as relevant under culpa levissima would have been 
tantamount to imposing strict liability. A case very often relied upon was a decision of the Sacro 
Consiglio of Naples reported by Matthaeus de Afflictis, on a fire in a rented house, where the problem 
of the omission of the conductor was a relevant issue: Decisiones Sacri Consilii Neapolitani, Lvdgvni, apud 
haeredes Iacobi Iuntae, 1552, dec. 57, p. 126, n. 7-8. Incidentally, it was on the basis of this reasoning 
that some jurists and courts alike excluded the Aquilian liability in case of omissions depending on 
culpa levissima. Apart from the same decision reported by de Afflictis (which remained the most 
important and relied upon by other courts), see also esp. Sacrae Rotae Romanae Decisionvm Recentiorvm a 
Pavlo Rvbeo ... selectarum (note 25), vol. 12 (1655-1658), dec. 159, p. 229, n. 21; Sacrae Rotae Romanae 
Decisiones coram R.P.D. Alexandro Lvdowisio (note 25), dec. 528 (14.4.1613), p. 743, n. 9; Decisiones 
Cavsarvm Tam Rotae Florentinae Quam Rotae Lucensis, Hieronymo Magonio I.V.D. Vrbeuetano Authore, 
Venetiis, apud Sessas, 1605, dec. 111, pp. 274-275, n. 25-26, where vast literature. 
Even the brocard “non facere, facere est” was not often applied to omissions giving rise to culpa 
levissima. Negligence was more commonly considered as privatio diligentiae: as the privatio was equated to 
facere, it pointed to some action of the negligent party. See e.g. the notes of Blasi Altimari to a decision 
(of 23.10.1625) of the Sacro Consiglio of Naples, reported in Scipione Rovito (ed.), Decisiones Supremorum 
Tribunalium Regni Neapolitani ... Necnon Regiae Camerae Summariae Scipione Rovito ... Compilatore ..., Neapoli, 
Ex Typographia Nicolai Abri., Expensis Antonij Bulifon., 1699, dec. 36, p. 201, n. 28. 
51 See e.g. the famed sixteenth-century gloss of Diego Pérez de Salamanca on the Nueva Recompilación 
(Madrid, 1779, en la Imprenta de Josef Doblado), vol. 2, lib. 5, tit. 7, ley 3, p. 1123. 
52 Pegas, Resolutiones forenses practicabiles (note 18), vol. 1, cap. 3, p. 123, n. 283: “Ratio prouenit ex natura 
contractus, nam qui mercedem accipit pro custodia rei, non tantum ad leuem, sed ad leuissimam 
culpam videtur obligari”. 
53 See e.g. a decision of 31.3.1656 of the Rota of Bologna, reported in the great collection of Cardinal 
Giovanni Battista De Luca (1614-1683), Theatrum Veritatis et Justitiae ..., Venetiis, 1716, apud Paulum 
Balleonium, vol. 4, disc. 11, p. 13, n. 2; Sacrae Rotae Romanae Decisionvm Recentiorvm a Pavlo Rvbeo ... 
selectarum (note 25), vol. 12 (1655-1658), dec. 159, p. 229, n. 22-23. 
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monetary reward.54 Secondly, because it links culpa levissima to custodia. The two reasons 
are connected: without a specific (and, in principle, additional) recompense the carrier 
could not be saddled with a higher standard of care precisely because such a standard 
would substantially violate the fault-based rule. Indeed, especially among courts, it is 
possible to find the same explanation formulated a contrario: it is the custodia itself that 
entails culpa levissima.55  
 
Looking at culpa levissima in substantive terms might well suggest its affinity with 
custodia – the main difference being just a nominal one. Abstract definitions would 
often seem to confirm as much. But concluding that this was the position of law 
courts would be rather misleading. General (and abstract) discussions do not consider 
a crucial point: in court, culpa was not examined separately from causality, especially in 
cases of culpa levissima. 
The point is of extreme importance. To approach it, we might want to take a step 
back and look at the different definition of culpa levissima provided by Baldus. His 
approach is slightly different, and it might help us to understand the different way in 
which courts looked at the matter.56 For Baldus, culpa levissima is a deviation from the 
very taxing standard required by the law in specific cases. This deviation consists in an 
omission that is likely to result in the mishap:57 
 
leuissima culpa est deuiatio a legis dispositione in eo quod lex disponit esse diligentissimum 
et non est culpa, sed dicitur leuissima quia est minima in culparum genere … enim [lex] 
requirit leuissimam, scilicet aliquid de contingentibus omissum quod si non esset omissum 
res verisimiliter salua foret 
 
Following this approach could be more fruitful to our (chiefly, practice-oriented) 
purposes. Not because the law did actually explain what such a supremely high 
diligence was, but because the system of presumptions elaborated by jurists and courts 
alike did.  
Baldus’ definition is of particular interest because it betrays the tension between 
the jurists’ efforts to use the language of fault inasmuch as possible and the objective 
features of a standard much closer to actual custodia. The consequence of this tension 
in his definition is a shift towards a presumption of causality between omission and 
                                                                          
54 On the point it is telling the contrast with the provision of Dig.4.9.5pr, which expressly spoke of 
liability custodiae nomine even if the payment of the shipmaster was not made so to undertake custodia: 
supra, note 31. 
55 See e.g. the Rota of Florence in a decision of 1579 (on the liability of the conductor for fire), in 
Decisiones Cavsarvm Tam Rotae Florentinae Quam Rotae Lucensis (note 50), dec. 111, p. 279, n. 54-55. Cf. 
Mascardus, Conclusiones Probationum Omnivm (note 25), vol. 1, concl. 470, p. 764, n. 3. Cf. e.g. Pegas, 
Resolutiones forenses practicabiles (note 18), vol. 1, cap. 3, p. 126, n. 326-327. 
56 This, it should be added ad cautelam, does not mean to say that Baldus had a clear influence on the 
development of forensic practice on fault issues and Bartolus did not. Matter of fact, neither author 
seems particularly influential towards the creation of the system of presumptions used by early modern 
civil law courts, at least on our subject. 
57 Baldus, ad Cod.4.24.6 (Baldi de Pervsio Ivrisconsvlti clarissimi super Quarto et quinto Codicis (note 37), fol. 
66rb-va, n. 13). Cf. N. Jansen, Die Struktur des Haftungsrechts: Geschichte, Theorie und Dogmatik 
ausservertraglicher Anspru ̈che auf Schadensersatz, Tu ̈bingen 2003, p. 286; H.-J. Hoffmann (note 20), pp. 50-
51; H. Dilcher (note 33), p. 83. 
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mishap, a presumption ultimately envisaged by the law when imposing that very high 
standard. What Baldus said was in its essence hardly new. Generations of civilians had 
already stressed the link (or at least tried hard to find one) between fault and mishap as 
a general principle, necessary to insist on the fault-based nature of the liability for 
most – possibly, all – contractual scenarios.58 To our purposes, however, it provides 
an excellent introduction to the approach of law courts.  
 
“Si non esset omissum res verisimiliter salua foret”, said Baldus.59 Stressing the 
pre-existing fault of the defendant allowed to speak of a praeordinatio of his fault to the 
mishap – and so of culpa ad casum praeordinata.60 This approach is easier to understand if 
we were to examine it moving from the mishap and looking backwards at the 
defendant’s conduct: a genuinely fortuitous accident is the accident that takes place in 
the absence of any prior fault of the defendant. In that case there is no such 
praeordinatio for the simple reason that there is no culpa. A contrario, the presence of 
some fault of sort before the occurrence of the mishap, while not proving their 
correlation, at least makes it possible. And in the case of culpa levissima, following 
Baldus’ approach, that correlation is established by the law not in principle but on a 
practical level, asking for an exceedingly high standard and requiring the defendant to 
prove a negative (the absence of the slightest degree of fault in an omission). 
Analysing culpa also in terms of (abstract) possibility of foreseeing and therefore 
anticipating an event allows to speak of a praeordinatio of sort – and therefore, loosely 
speaking, of causation.61 In Baldus’ definition it is the law to impose the very high 
standard of culpa levissima in specific situations, although the term culpa levissima is 
almost entirely absent from the Roman sources.62 But, as said, Baldus’ approach could 
be used also moving from the opposite direction: not from the imposition of culpa 
levissima onwards, so as to envisage a possible causal link with the mishap, but from 
the occurrence of that mishap backwards, so to presume the occurrence of some fault 
of sort in the defendant, possibly just in the form of a slight omission. The possibility 
that the mishap could have been averted if it was not for that slight omission 
admittedly makes for a rather weak causal link. That is why Baldus limited it only to 
the cases where the link was imposed by the law. 
A - similarly tenuous - link was also found when the shipmaster wilfully disobeyed 
a specific order of the shipmaster, and then loss ensued. In that case, the disobedience 
pre-dated the mishap, and the faulty state of the shipmaster was presumptively 
associated with the occurrence of the loss. That much sufficed to speak of culpa 
ordinata ad casum.63 This was not a specific exception provided for a maritime context, 
                                                                          
58 See esp. W. Engelmann (note 33), pp. 207-214. 
59 Supra, note 57. 
60 W. Engelmann (note 33), p. 209. 
61 Ibid., pp. 215-217. Proper discussions of causality (and so, of ordinatio of the culpa to the casus) by 
medieval jurists may be found on other subjects, but – rather unsurprisingly - not with regard to culpa 
levissima. Cf. ibid., pp. 218-224. 
62 The main place where it appears is in relation to the lex Aquilia (D.9.2.44pr), a case dealing with 
liability for omission, and possibly with a rather narrow scope. See recently O. Tellegen-Couperus, The 
limits of culpa levissima, LXXVI (2008) Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis, pp. 19-25. 
63 R.P.D. Matthaei Bvratti ... Decisiones (note 49), vol. 1, dec. 5 (Rota of Rome, 3.6.1613), p. 8, n. 12: 
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but rather an easy adaptation of the standard case of the mandatee’s wilful disregard of 
the mandator’s instructions, which was typically considered more than sufficient to 
trigger the mandatee’s liability in case of damage or loss.64 Examined in terms of actual 
causation, the link would not hold. But the fact that the omission (non-compliance 
with orders) preceded the mishap was sufficient at least to argue for their possibile 
correlation. If the omission both preceded the mishap and - just as Baldus had it - was 
likely to have caused it, then it was all the more possible to think of a causal link. What 
could suggest this likelihood, however, was more often the kind of mishap. And the 
approach of law courts was precisely this: determining the burden of proof on the 
basis of the kind of mishap, not on the standard of care of the defendant.  
 
2.3. The approach of civil law courts: introduction 
 
To appreciate the position of early modern civil law courts, and especially the great 
weight that the classification of the mishap had on the allocation of the burden of 
proof, we might start with a normal case of culpa levis: the standard case of the conductor 
outside the maritime context. 
As we have seen, a “normal” conductor was subjected to the standard of culpa levis. 
The standard of care, as said, was very high, yet the burden of proof lay with the 
counterparty, the locator. What the locator had to prove was not just a slight fault in the 
conductor, but especially the causal link between that fault and the occurrence of the 
mishap. In other words, the counterparty had to prove that the culpa was ordinata ad 
casum.65 The (very common) statement that culpa must be proven and never 
                                                                          	
“exemplo nautae, qui tenetur de eo, quod sequitur etiam ex causa tempestatis, si nauem contra domini 
voluntatem portuit applicauerit”. The same decision (on a dispute about a privateering agreement) may 
be also found in Prospero Farinacci (1554-1618), Sacrae Rotae Romanae Decisionum recentiorum a Prospero 
Farinaccio J.C. Romano selectarum, Venetiis, apud Paulum Balleonium, 1716, vol. 1, dec. 493, p. 433, n. 4.  
64 See e.g. Cesare Manenti (fl.1612), Decisiones Sacri Senatus Mantuani Caesare Manento ... Avthore ..., 
Venetiis, apud Antonium Pinellum, 1622, dec. 54, p. 211, n. 59-60: the mandatee who acts against his 
orders is “in culpa inexcusabili” and is liable for any supervening casus fortuitus. Cf. e.g. Pier Paolo 
Parisio (1473-1545), Consiliorvm Petri Pavli Parisii ... Venetiis, 1580, vol. 1, cons. 47, fols. 104v-107v, esp. 
fol. 106r-v, n. 38-42 and 61-63. The same scheme (pre-existing culpa and subsequent mishap) found 
application also in other subjects, always dispensing with problematic issues on causation. For liability 
arising from fire see e.g. a decision reported by Farinacci, Dn. Prosp. Farinacij ... Consilia siue Responsa 
atqve Decisiones Cavsarvm Criminalivm, Coloniae Allobrogvm, Excudebat Philippvs Gamonetvs, 1649, vol. 
1, cons. 114 (Rota of Rome, 18.4.1597), Additio a, p. 143: “Quando constat Dominum esse in aliqua 
culpa praecedente incendium, quamvis illud fuerit caussatum (sic) posteriori culpa ipsius famuli, tunc 
quod Dominus teneatur de dicto incendio, etiam quod famulus culpam non commiserit in suo 
officio...”.  
65 Pegas, Resolutiones forenses practicabiles (note 18), vol. 1, cap. 3, p. 96, n. 35: “culpa in his terminis dicitur 
ad casum ordinata, si ex ea poterat euenire casus”. Cf. Marcantonio Savelli (c.1624-1695), Marci Antonii 
Sabelli ... Summa Diversorum Tractatuum ... collecta, ac propriis locis distributa a Leopoldo Josepho Crescini, 
Venetiis, Ex Typographia Balleoniana, 1748, vol. 1, lib. 1, s.v. Casus, p. 226, n. 5, and esp. Menochio, 
Iacobi Menochii ... De Praesumptionibus, Conjectvris, Signis, et Indiciis, Commentaria ..., Genevae, Sumptibus 
Leonardi Chövet et Socij, 1686, vol. 2, lib. 5, praes. 3, p. 660, n. 138: “Et etiam observandum, quod 
ille, qui asserit casum evenisse culpa alicujus, probare debet culpam ipsam fuisse ordinatam ad casum, 
et ob id quod si culpa illa commissa non fuisset, casus non contigisset.” 
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presumed,66 therefore, implied that the plaintiff had to prove both the failure of the 
defendant to uphold a certain standard of care, and that such a failure led to the loss 
or damage. Thus, ascertaining the defendant’s liability meant proving that his conduct 
fell short of a certain standard on the one hand, and that that led to the occurrence of 
the damage or loss on the other.67 
If the very taxing standard of culpa levis made relatively easy for the plaintiff 
suggesting some slight fault in the conductor, the problem was how to link that fault to 
the actual mishap. Law courts had a broad notion of culpa levis, but insisted on the 
need of clear and strong causality link between the conductor’s fault and the loss or 
damage.68 As the Roman Rota had it, “a remote cause removes the effect”.69 The 
causality link had to be either direct (the fault resulting immediately in the mishap), or 
at least sufficiently visible to establish a direct chain of causation.  
A good example is a decision of the Roman Rota of the middle of the seventeenth 
century (1656), reviewing a previous decision rendered the year before by the same 
court. The case was a simple contract of carriage between merchant consignor (the 
locator) and muleteer (the conductor). The mule fell from a cliff, causing the utter loss of 
all that it carried. The muleteer-conductor argued that, being a casus fortuitus, he was not 
liable. And indeed the first decision of the Rota dismissed the merchant-locator’s suit 
because, even if the defendant’s culpa was sufficiently established, its relationship with 
the mishap was not. The defendant’s culpa had to be “certain, specific, and leading 
[praeordinata] to the mishap”.70 On appeal, however, the merchant-locator was able to 
prove that, at the time of the mishap, the conductor had been 50 feet away from the 
mule. So he claimed that the mule had fallen off the cliff because of the conductor’s lack 
of diligence.71 But the court argued that the distance of the muleteer from the mule 
was proven only with regard to the time in which the mule died, not also before that. 
As such, the proof was not sufficient to establish the direct causality link between fault 
and mishap.72 The culpa proven thus far was not praeordinata to the mishap.73 The 
                                                                          
66 Pegas, Resolutiones forenses practicabiles (note 18), vol. 1, cap. 3, p. 99, n. 58: “Advertendum etiam est, 
quod culpa in casu fortuito non praesumitur, sed probanda est ab eo, qui illam imponit”. Cf. e.g. 
Mascardus, Conclusiones Probationum Omnivm (note 25), vol. 1, concl. 78, p. 199, n. 31. 
67 Pegas, Resolutiones forenses practicabiles (note 18), vol. 1, cap. 3, p. 99, n. 64-65: “Nec sufficit, quod 
testes de culpa deponentes dicant illam interuenisse in actu; debent enim declarare, in quo consistere 
potuit; et qualiter adhiberi remedium potuisse, ne casus eueniret ... Adeo, quod non sufficit culpam 
probare in genere, sed deberet probari in specie, certe, et limitate”. 
68 The same notion did not seem to change much over the time, at least in principle. In this sense, a 
particularly clear decision of the Roman Rota (of 6.5.1816) may be found in the collection of Andrea 
Barberi, Decisiones Sacrae Rotae Romanae coram R.P.D. Karolo ex Ducibus Odescalchi ... Romae, apud 
Bernardinum Olivieri Typographum Archigym. Rom., 1836, vol. 1, dec. 13 (Romana Remissionis 
Mercedis), pp.56-58. 
69 Ibid., vol. 2 (apud Dominicum Ercole, 1837), dec. 170 (3.7.1818), p. 239, n. 2: “remota causa 
removetur effectus”. 
70 Sacrae Rotae Romanae Decisionvm Recentiorvm a Pavlo Rvbeo ... selectarum (note 25), vol. 12 (1655-1658), 
dec. 159, p. 229, n. 6: “allegans culpam tenetur eam justificare certam, specificam, et praeordinatam ad 
casum”. The first decision dated 26.3.1655; the second one was rendered on 31.3.1656. 
71 Ibid., n. 14-15. 
72 Ibid., n. 16. 
73 Ibid., n. 17. 
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decision is interesting in that it offers a good example – if not an isolated one,74 
perhaps more explicit that others – of what this praeordinatio of the fault to the mishap 
actually meant. In principle, it was a linear relationship between fault and mishap, 
whereby the latter was the clear, direct and immediate result of the former.75 The 
ordinatio culpae ad casum must be understood substantially in the sense of the modern 
conditio sine qua non test.76 And this is why the culpa is not ordinata to the mishap if it 
does not lead directly to it.77 The presence of another causally relevant fact (whether 
action or omission) occurring between faulty behaviour and mishap would bend the 
causality line, blurring its cause-effect dynamics. In other words, the ordinatio culpae ad 
casum presupposes an immediate (in its etymological sense of nec mediata) relationship 
between conduct and event.78 The elements brought forth by the plaintiff, concluded 
                                                                          
74 See e.g. Fontanella, Decisiones Sacri Regii Senatus Cathaloniae (note 26), vol. 2, dec. 534, p. 504, n. 4, 7, 9 
and esp. 12. 
75 Ibid., n. 9: “quando enim culpae est imputandus casus, necessarium est, illam fuisse ad casum 
ordinatam, ita vt aliter non successisset, set sic quod causa, ac illa quidem immediata, culpa fuisset 
casus”. The same immediateness also applied in the opposite case: when the shipmaster did something 
to prevent the casus from happening. It is the case of jettison, to which the merchants had to 
contribute only if the shipmaster could prove the immediate causality between his conduct and the 
aim to avoid the danger. Cf. e.g. Casaregis, Discursus Legales de Commercio (note 8), vol. 1, disc. 19, p. 52, 
n. 17-18 (vol. 1, p. 100, in the first edition of 1719): “pro contributione exigenda a Mercatoribus 
probari debet, quod damnum navi causatum processerit a causa, seu facto immediate, et directe 
tendente ad finem evitandi illud periculum imminens ... Ideoque Doctores optime in uno 
convenerunt, quod si navis rumpatur, aut exarmetur ob vim ventorum, aut tempestatum, nulla 
debeatur Avaria, sed solum in casu, quo voluntate, et facto immediate, et directe tendente ad 
conservationem navis, et mercium a periculo sponte caedatur, et in mare deiiciantur arbores, vel 
armamenta, itaut alia damna sint positive navi causata, et immediate ex facto Patroni ea sponte 
deliberanteis ad effectum evitandi pericula”. Cf. Josephus Gibalinus (Joseph de Gibalin, 1592-1671), 
R.P. Josephi Gibalini … De Vniversa Rervm Humanarvm Negotiatione, Tractato Scientifica Utrique foro perutilis. 
Ex Iure Naturali, Ecclesiastico, Civili, Romano, et Gallico …, Sumptib. Philippi Borde, Lavrentii Arnavd, 
Petri Borde, et Gvlielmi Barbier, Lvgdvni, 1663, vol. 2, lib. 4, cap. 11, p. 296, n. 7: “... Quod idem 
dicendum erit si nauis gubernator nulla tempestate, aut necessitate adactus, sed proprio consilio 
directum cursum omittens, compulsus deinde fuerit iactum facere, de illo tenebitur, non assecurator, 
qui non se obligauit nisi ad pericula quae via ordinaria contigunt, vel si extraordinaria sunt ex 
necessitate, non culpa nautarum accident.” 
76 Sacrae Rotae Romanae Decisionvm Recentiorvm a Pavlo Rvbeo ... selectarum (note 25), vol. 12 (1655-1658), 
dec. 159, p. 229, n. 12: “quod vt possit onerari conductor, sit necessarium probare, non potuisse casum 
contingere nisi culp[a] intercessisset”. Cf. e.g. Casaregis, Discursus Legales de Commercio (note 8), vol. 1, 
disc. 1, p. 6, n. 83 (vol. 1, p. 10, in the first edition of 1719): “Intellige, seu declara, quod si casus 
sinister evenit etiam existente culpa Institoris, Domini, ac Nautae, quae tam casui causam non dedit, 
itaut ea non existente nullatenus contingisset casus, assecuratores tenentur, quia quoties alicuius culpae, 
casus, qui evenit, adscribitur, demonstrandum necessario est culpam illam ad casum fuisse dispositam, 
atque ordinatam, itaut nisi propter eam culpam casus nequaquam fuisset eventurus”. For a short 
introduction on the conditio sine qua non test see most recently S. Steel, Proof of Causation in Tort Law, 
Cambridge 2015, pp. 16-17. In the discussion of early modern doctrine and courts the conditio sine qua 
non test was understood in rather broad terms, which today would be considered as encompassing also 
contributory causation when particularly relevant as to the production (or the non-occurrence) of the 
result. See further H.-J. Wieling, Interesse und Privatstrafe vom Mittelalter bis zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, 
Köln-Wien 1979, pp. 45-51. 
77 On issues of causation jurists tended to focus more on Aquilian liability, but even there the 
mainstream position tended to be rather strict: ibid., pp. 229-232. 
78 As the Rota of Florence had it (in a late sixteenth century decision). “necesse est, quod ipsa culpa sit 
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the court, would have been sufficient to find against the conductor only if he was liable 
also for culpa levissima.79 Which is precisely where we have to look now. 
 
2.4. Culpa levissima, causality and presumptions 
 
Baldus’ definition, it may be recalled, pointed to a link between the imposition of 
culpa levissima in specific cases and the likelihood that the slight fault of the defendant 
led to the occurrence of the mishap. That link amounted to a legal presumption of 
causality. The presumption was rebuttable, but it inverted the normal burden of proof 
to the disadvantage of the defendant. Approaching the matter from the mishap, and 
not from the specific cases where culpa levissima applied, the courts ultimately did the 
same. With the distinct advantage that, instead of moving from culpa levissima, such an 
approach led to it. On a practical level, this exempted the bench from explaining the 
precise nature of culpa levissima. The twist, however, was not just meant to circumvent 
thorny substantive issues. It was one of the consequences of the increasing common 
and rigid system of judicial presumptions. 
If culpa could be construed as the violation of a certain standard, so could causation 
itself. The obvious difference was that, in this second case, the link was only 
presumptively established. But this was a necessity due to the stringent nature of the 
praeordinatio – the direct causation link that the plaintiff was supposed to prove. This 
led the courts to make increasingly frequent use of a series of standards not (or not 
directly) focused on culpa, but on causation itself.80 Those standards were vague 
enough to allow (and so, encourage) a probabilistic approach on causation.81 And this, 
in turn, ultimately led to the development of a system of presumptions.82 While 
rebuttable in principle, their repeated application in subsequent decisions made such 
presumptions increasingly difficult to challenge. Common sense often became 
common knowledge, strengthening the weight of brocards and ultimately freeing the 
bench from thorny underlying issues.83 Later on, the attitude of (some) civilians and, 
                                                                          	
ordinata, ad ipsum casum, et sic immediata, non autem mediata” (Sforza degli Oddi, Consiliorvm sive 
Responsorvm, D. Sfortiae Oddi Pervsini ... Venetiis, 1593, apud Iunctas, vol. 1, cons. 31, fol. 94r, n. 7). 
79 Sacrae Rotae Romanae Decisionvm Recentiorvm a Pavlo Rvbeo ... selectarum (note 25), vol. 12 (1655-1658), 
dec. 159, p. 229, n. 20. 
80 Pegas, Resolutiones forenses practicabiles (note 18), vol. 1, cap. 3, p. 96, n. 37-40: “Sicuti etiam dicitur 
ordinata ad casum, si culposus fuit praemonitus, et noluit parere ... Item dicitur culpa ordinata ad 
casum, si aliquis non faciat, quod diligens, seu diligentissimus paterfamilias secundum naturam 
contractus fecisset ... Rursus dicitur culpa ordinata ad casum, si faciat aliquid contra conuentionem ... 
Consideratur etiam culpa ordinata ad casum, in vtente re ad alium vsum, quam ad quem sibi 
commodata fuit.” 
81 Ibid., n. 36: “Vbi subdit non esse necessarium, quod culpa sit praecise ordinata ad casum, sed 
sufficere, quod secundum possibilitatem actus dicatur ordinata, hoc est, quod possibile sit ex illa causa 
effectum sequi.” The point is quite older, and can be traced back several centuries. See e.g. Petrus de 
Ancharano (c.1330-1416), ... Consilia seu responsa ... [Lugduni, J. Moylin ... Typographus] 1539, cons. 
348, fol. 146r, n. 2. 
82 For the – complementary – discussion on the more theoretical profiles of legal presumptions in the 
same period see A. Giuliani, Civilian Treatises on Presumptions, 1580-1620, in R. Helmholz (ed.), The Law 
of Presumptions: Essays in Comparative Legal History, Berlin 2009, pp. 21-71. 
83 Brocards ultimately conveyed legal presumptions, even when that was not necessarily obvious. Let 
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eventually, of law courts towards the use of presumptions became more critical, 
especially in criminal law.84 By contrast, on issues of damages, the use of presumptions 
continued to be openly invoked and relied upon, especially when the precise causality 
link was difficult to establish.85 
With specific regard to maritime accidents, some maxims were developed by 
analogy with land-carriage. Clearly, leading a mule or a horse through a dangerous and 
unknown path is faulty, especially if there is an alternative way. The same for the 
ship’s route.86 Similarly, an old and sickly mule is no different from an old and worn 
ship: the carrier should not use either.87 Nor should he overload them.88 And if he is 
caught smuggling, the seizure of the merchandise is just as likely when they are on a 
cart as when they are in a ship.89 Versatile as mules and horses can be, however, there 
was a limit to the extent to which general and simple rules thought for driving a cart 
could be used in a nautical context. When the jurists started to write specifically on 
maritime law, they found such parallels of limited help. This encouraged them to 
elaborate some presumptions of causality specifically thought for maritime commerce. 
This however does not mean that the whole system was the jurists’ creation. Jurists, so 
to say, got the ball rolling first, and then explained ex post the whole game. But they 
were not at the centre of it. That place pertains to the courts.  
                                                                          	
us take for instance an apparently non-committal maritime-related brocard: sailors are to be considered 
neither among the living nor among the dead. On the face of it, the brocard would have little 
probatory weight: it does not point to any specific conclusion in terms of liability. And yet, it was on its 
basis that the Court of Savona (presided by the well known jurist Hieronymus Marlianus - Girolamo 
Marliani, d.1611) formed its opinion as to the necessity of the actions of a shipmaster who ended up 
sinking his vessel in the late sixteenth century. Decisiones Avreae, et Peregrinae ... Avctore Hieronymo Marliano 
..., Papiae, apud Andream Vianum, 1597, dec. 91 (7.12.1578), p. 257, n. 13. The ship was leaving the 
port of Messina and then met with a storm. The shipmaster steered towards land and wracked the 
ship. In absolving the shipmaster, the court explained: “quando reus discessit a portu Messanae non 
potuit praeuidere naufragium, et propterea si quando discessit se non tenuit in altum mare non potest 
dici in aliqua culpa, postea vero, quando fuit insultatus, propter imminens naufragium non potuit 
capere altum mare, et sic non fuit [culpa] ordinata ad casum, et cum suborta fuerit de improuiso 
tempestas consultus fuit ab existentibus in fregata, vt se reduceret ad litus pro euitando periculo mortis 
quibus (cum essent nautae) credere debuit” (emphasis added). For other cases where the same brocard was 
invoked - to the same end - in other coeval decisions see e.g. Marcus Antonius Bellonius 
(Marc’Antonio Bellone, fl.1580), Decisiones Rotae Genvae de Mercatvra et Pertinentibvs ad eam ..., Venetiis 
[apud Franciscum Zilettum], 1582, dec. 36, fol. 114r, n. 6. 
84 See e.g. the classical work of B. Schnapper, Les Peines Arbitraires du XIIIe au XVIIIe Siècle (Doctrines 
Savantes et Usages Français), XLI (1973) Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis, pp. 237-277, and XLII (1974), pp. 
82-112, esp. 87-89. See also G.P. Demuro, Il Dolo, Milano 2007, vol. 1, pp. 132-134, on the distinction 
between dolus verus and dolus praesumptus - and the scope of the latter especially in Tiberio Deciani. 
85 E.g. de Afflictis, Decisiones Sacri Consilii Neapolitani (note 50), dec. 57, p. 125, n. 3. On the subject of 
locatio-conductio, one of the closest examples of the culpa levissima of the shipmaster was that of the 
conductor of a habitation in case of fire. See e.g. Alexander Raudensis (Alessandro da Rho, ca.1542-
1627), Decisionum Pisanarvm Alexandri Ravdensi, Mediolani, apud Hieronymum Bordonum, et Petrum 
Martyrem Locarnum, 1601, vol. 1, dec. 6, p. 125, n. 56. 
86 Cf. Pegas, Resolutiones forenses practicabiles (note 18), vol. 1, cap. 3, pp. 96 and 98, n. 41 and 56 
respectively. See infra, text and notes 143-144. 
87 Pegas, Resolutiones forenses practicabiles (note 18), vol. 1, cap. 3, p. 96, n. 42. 
88 Ibid., p. 98, n. 46. 
89 Ibid., n. 47. 
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In a maritime context, presumptions of causality were introduced by jurists on the 
basis of Roman law sources. Such presumptions were hardly sophisticated and poorly 
elaborated, but their success among other jurists and courts alike led to the 
crystallisation of a series of typical scenarios in which the fault was presumed and 
presumedly linked (in causal terms) with the mishap.  
If we look at the development of the principle that culpa must be ordinata ad casum 
on the specific case of the shipmaster, probably the first jurist to deal with it (or 
rather, to write more than the few lines always devoted to the locus classicus of D.4.9.5) 
is the Portuguese Petrus Santerna (Pedro de Santarém, c.1460–?). Santerna states with 
admirable clarity that the insurer is liable for the culpa of the shipmaster when the 
latter’s faulty behaviour leads to the mishap.90 The problem is that he is clearly 
thinking of dolus, not culpa. Santerna introduces the subject of the master’s fault within 
a broader discussion on the insurer’s liability for mishaps imputable to the wrongful 
behaviour of the insured. During such discussion, to avoid any uncertainty as to the 
lack of the insurers’ liability, Santerna provides three examples all pointing to 
intentional wrongdoing. In the first the insured manages to load some forbidden 
merchandise onboard; in the second, he asks that the ship sail towards a restricted or 
forbidden area; in the third, he does not pay the customs for his cargo.91 A generous 
qualification of such behaviours might be culpa lata, but it is clear that the subject-
matter is substantially dolus. It is only after these examples that Santerna starts 
discussing the insurers’ liability for the culpa of the shipmaster. And it is significant that 
his conclusion - the insurer is liable - derives from the fact that the insurer is bound to 
bear liability for the dolus of a third party (“de dolo tertii provenientis”). Much unlike 
the merchant insured, the shipmaster is a third party in respect to the insurance 
policy.92  
Santerna refers to some important passages in Roman and canon law sources93 to 
apply the principle “qui occasionem damni dat, damnum dedisse videtur” to the 
insurance context. In Santerna’s treatise the discussion about causation is entirely 
centered on reprisals (for the old problem of whether the shipmaster ought to be 
considered responsible for the reprisal if it was his past conduct that triggered the 
reprisal itself).94 Clearly, the reasoning is applicable to other insurance matters.95 But 
                                                                          
90 Santerna, Tractatvs pervtilis et quotidianus, De Assecvrationibus et Sponsionibus Mercatorum, à D. Petro Santerna 
Lusitano ..., Antverpiae, apud Gerardum Spelmannum, 1554, pt. 4, fols. 56v-57r, n. 18-19. 
91 Ibid., fol. 56v, n. 17. 
92 Ibid., fol. 58r, n. 58. The only exception to this is when the insured would stand to gain something 
from the dolus of the third party (here, the shipmaster), or he even took part in the same dolus: ibid., fol. 
58v, n. 23. 
93 Esp. D.9.2.30.3 and C.23, q.5, c.8 - but surprisingly not also X.5.36.9. Cf. G.P. Massetto, 
Responsabilita ̀ Extracontrattuale (Diritto Intermedio), in Enciclopedia del Diritto, XXXIX, Milano 1988, pp. 
1099-1186 at 1129-30. See further, more recently, E. van Dongen, Contributory Negligence. A Historical 
and Comparative Study, Leiden 2014, pp. 150-152, and especially M. Carni ̀, La Responsabilita ̀ 
Extracontrattuale nel Diritto Canonico Medievale, unpublished PhD thesis, Università degli Studi di 
Macerata, 2014, pp. 123-134, where ample literature. 
94 Santerna, De Assecvrationibus (note 90), pt. 4, fols. 64v-67r, n. 37-42. A different problem, discussed 
without solution of continuity from the middle ages to the early modern period, was whether the 
nationality of the shipmaster was enough to impute to his culpa the reprisals - and so, the ensuing loss. 
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Santerna is silent on a crucial point: to what extent does the same principle apply to 
other acts of the shipmaster. 
On the problem of causality between culpa and casus, the next, and equally famed, 
legal writer of maritime commerce, Stracca, is hardly more exhaustive than his 
predecessor. Following the example set by Santerna, Stracca deals with the culpa of the 
shipmaster when discussing about reprisals, providing the classical examples on faulty 
behaviour of the shipmaster (sailing in wintertime or in bad weather, overloading the 
ship, sailing across notoriously dangerous places or trading the normal route for a new 
and little known one, etc.)96 without further guidance on more specific and 
problematic issues.  
Similarly unhelpful is Stracca’s treatment of the fault of the shipmaster, amounting 
to a short a description of the main examples found in Roman law sources. What he 
says on the subject in his treatise De Assecurationibus is in effect a re-elaboration (which 
bears clear marks of Santerna’s influence) of what written in his earlier treatise De 
Nautis. Most of part 3 of De Nautis is a reasoned list of cases on the shipmaster’s 
culpa.97 But this list is remarkably generic and abstract, with very little to offer to a law 
court. The principle that the culpa must be ordinata ad casum is stated or implied many 
times (indeed Stracca continues to repeat this mantra even when he starts part 4 of the 
same treatise),98 but is never elaborated. 
The dyad Santerna-Stracca had an enormous influence both on law courts and on 
later authors (whose authority in turn contributed even further to enhance the prestige 
of the two earlier jurists in the eyes of the bench). Their insistence on the fact that the 
shipmaster’s culpa must be ordinata ad casum (or causam dans), although rather abstract 
and poorly explained, had a similarly significant weight. The fault of the master was a 
secondary point in the discussion of Santerna and Stracca alike: this would explain the 
remarkably simplified way in which both authors dealt with it. Simplified as it might 
                                                                          	
One would be tempted to dismiss the subject as merely theoretical (why should the shipmaster be 
considered at fault if the reprisals were issued against the whole natio?), but in fact there are decisions 
on the subject well into the seventeenth century. Possibly the reason why such an issue was actually 
debated (and not simply dismissed) is that it required to clarify the relationship between imputability 
and culpability: if the reprisal occurs because of the nationality of the shipmaster, then to some extent 
the mishap might be considered as also imputable to him. Provided that the mishap is imputable (at 
least by association) to the person of the shipmaster, however, the courts would move on to examine 
whether the same relationship exists between mishap and conduct of the same shipmaster. An 
interesting example may be found in a decision of the Genoese mercantile Rota reported in De Luca, 
Theatrum Veritatis et Justitiae (note 53), vol. 8, disc. 109 (policy of 3.12.1666), p.189, n.7: “Et quamvis 
ego ponderarem, quod cum casus non provenerit a tempestate, vel alio accidenti naturae, minusque a 
pyratis, sed a classe Hispanica ratione belli cum Lusitanis, quali erat assecuratus, ideoque dici posset 
casus sequutus in suis odium, atque ab eius inimicis, attamen reflectendo ad veritatem agnoscebam, 
quod motivum non subsisteret, cum ageretur de bello publico, et nationali citra culpam assecurati”. 
95 So much so that he hastens to clarify that the same conclusion should not be applied to jettison: 
Santerna, De Assecvrationibus (note 90), pt. 4, fols. 67r-68r, n. 43-45.  
96 Stracca, De Assecurationibus (note 40), gl. 20, fols. 113v-114r, n. 3, and in particular Id., de Nautis (note 
40), pt. 3, esp. pp. 251-258, n. 4-6, 12-21 and 25. 
97 Stracca, Tractatus de Nauibus, in Id., Tractatvs Clariss. Ivrisconsvlti Benvenvti Stracchae Anconitani, de Nautis, 
Nauibus, et Nauigatione (note 40), esp. pp. 308-311, n. 16-26. 
98 Id., De Nautis, (note 40), pt. 4, pp. 269-270, n. 2-3. 
Historia et ius - ISSN 2279-7416 www.historiaetius.eu - 12/2017 - paper 12 
 23	
be, however, their approach soon became a topos, and those examples became the 
main cases where the fault of the shipmaster was considered as causam dans by 
definition. This paved the way for the fragmentation of the shipmaster’s culpa into 
discrete categories, which progressively crystallised in as many presumptions.  
 
The list of cases where the master is at fault for the mishap proved considerably 
successful, and it was re-elaborated by other authors, among whom the most 
influential (and the most quoted by the law courts) was probably Roccus. In his De 
Navibus et Naulo99 he provided an ample list of cases where the shipmaster is at fault. 
Among them, the main ones are seven: i. grounding the ship, unless that depended on 
winds or other kinds of vis maior;100 ii. sailing in bad weather, especially in 
wintertime;101 iii. keeping the cargo onboard for a long time after arrival at 
destination;102 iv. choosing ill-famed, incompetent or just unknown people to man the 
ship;103 v. smuggling;104 vi. using another country’s flag;105 vii. not defending the ship 
against attacks.106 This list of cases was widely shared among civilians.107 Similarly 
fortunate were the cases in which the mishap was presumed to be fortuitous - and so 
the shipmaster was presumed not to be responsible for it.108 Among these cases, 
clearly based on Roman law sources,109 the chief ones were, predictably enough, 
                                                                          
99 Roccus, De Navibus et Navlo (note 41). 
100 Ibid., not. 55, p. 375, n. 151-153. 
101 Ibid., not. 56, p. 375, n. 154-155; cf. also Roccus’ treatise De Assecurationibus, in Id., Responsorum 
legalium cum decisionibus (note 41), not. 38, p. 403, n. 119-120. 
102 Roccus, De Navibus et Navlo (note 41), not. 57, p. 375, n. 157-158. 
103 Ibid., not. 62, p. 376, n. 168-169. 
104 Ibid., not. 66, p. 377, n. 180. 
105 Ibid., not. 66, p. 377, n. 181-182. 
106 Ibid., not. 70, p. 378, n. 190. 
107 See e.g. Gibalinus, De Vniversa Rervm Humanarvm Negotiatione (note 75), vol. 2, lib. 4, cap. 11, p. 296, 
n. 7: “Si nauarchus contra pactum mutauerit destinatum iter absque necessitate, lucri causa, inscio vel 
inuito assecuratore; si sciens mare infestum piratis, et hostibus, nolente assecuratore, illumque casum 
excipiente nauigauerit, si nauem non direxit ad eum portum de quo conuenerat; si nauem onerauit 
mercibus illicitis, quae deinde idcirco publicatae sunt; de eis omnibus non tenebitur assecurator, sed 
nauis dominus”. Cf. Hevia Bolaño, Laberinto de Comercio Terrestre y Naval (note 41), lib. 3, cap. 11, p. 617, 
n. 3-4, and esp. cap. 12, pp. 628-634, n. 6, 9-16, 18, 23-24, 27, 29, 31; Johannes Loccenius (Johan 
Locken, 1598-1677), Johannis Loccenii J.C. De Jure Maritimo et Navali Libri Tres (3rd edn.), Holmiae, apud 
P. de Dobbeleer [ca.1660], lib. 1, cap. 7, pp. 63-64, n.3; Laurentius Sylvanus (Lorenzo Silvano, c.1500-
c.1570), Consilia D. Laurentii Sylvani ..., Lvdgvni, apud Theobaldum Paganum, 1551, cons. 46, p. 333, n. 
8; Parladorio, Quotidianarum differentiarum Sesquicenturia (note 22), diff. 132, p. 423, n. 16. 
108 As the Rota of Genoa had it, in such cases the shipmaster is “solutus ... ab omni obligatione”. 
Mercantile Rota of Genoa, decision of 3.10.1674, reported in Balducci’s collection, Jacobi Balduccii, Alias 
Rotae Civilis Serenissimae Reipublicae Genuae ... Auditoris, Decisiones, et Res Judicatae ..., Parmae, 1703, Typis, 
et sumptibus Pauli Monti, vol. 1, tit. 1 (De Assicurationibus) dec. 5, p. 15, n. 15. 
109 One of the most complete lists of the Roman law texts used by early modern jurists with regard to 
vis maior in a marine commercial context is to be found in the (vastly influential) work of Sigismondus 
Scaccia (1564-1634), Sigismvndi Scacciae ... Tractatus de Commerciis et Cambio ..., Romae, sumptibus Andreae 
Brugiotti, ex Typographia Iacobi Mascardi, 1619, § 1, q. 1, p. 37, n. 135. The passages quoted are 
D.2.11.3, D.4.9.3.1, D.13.6.18pr, D.39.2.24.4 and C.4.34.1. To these, another relevant Roman law text 
that should be mentioned is D.7.1.12.1 (see esp. Manenti, Decisiones Sacri Senatus Mantuani (note 64), 
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shipwreck and seastorms on the one hand, and pirates, privateers and enemies on the 
other.110 Other important kinds of mishaps were either not mentioned or discussed 
perfunctorily.111 
It is important to stress the role played by those cases – both those leading to 
liability and those excluding it. In each scenario, the mishap is either presumptively 
imputed to the shipmaster’s fault, or presumptively considered as wholly independent 
from his conduct. The specific features of the kind of mishap, in other words, pre-
determined both the presence of fault and its relevance towards the loss or damage. 
Combining causality with liability meant that it was sufficient to look at the kind of 
mishap to determine – at least prima facie – whether the defendant was liable or not. 
Thus, the probabilistic approach to causation allowed to allocate the burden of proof 
first and foremost on the basis of the kind of mishap.112 The specific standard of care 
of the contract was in practice less important. So the shipmaster was not 
presumptively held liable because his standard of care was culpa levissima, but because 
of the nature of the mishap, which suggested the presence of culpa. This also meant 
that the difference between shipmaster (conductor under culpa levissima) and other kinds 
of conductores (under culpa levis) was less important in practice than it was in theory. The 
emphasis on the kind of mishap, in other words, relegated to a secondary role the 
specific features of contratual liability. This way, it was the nature of the mishap to 
determine the burden of proof in most contractual relationship. So for instance (to 
give just a few examples on our subject) the land-carrier who travelled in wintertime 
was subjected to the same presumption of fault as the shipmaster who did likewise, 
despite that his standard of fault was culpa levis and not levissima.113 Similarly, 
                                                                          	
dec. 54, p. 211, n. 1).  
110 E.g., in rough chronological order: Marliani, Decisiones Avreae, et Peregrinae (note 83), dec. 91 
(7.12.1578), p. 257, n. 11-12; Manenti, Decisiones Sacri Senatus Mantuani (note 64), dec. 54, p. 211, n. 1; 
Hevia Bolaño, Laberinto de Comercio Terrestre y Naval (note 41), lib. 3, cap. 12, p. 634, n. 31; Balducci, 
Decisiones et Res Judicatae (note 108), 1703, vol. 1, tit. 1, dec. 10 (15.7.1694), p. 28, n. 19; Bartolomeo 
Artimini, Raccolta delle Decisioni della Ruota Fiorentina dal 1700 al 1808, Disposte per ordine cronologico, Firenze, 
presso Leonardo Marchini, 1850, vol. 10, dec. 873 (28.9.1735), pp. 314 and 319-320, n. 5-6 and 22-26 
respectively.  
111 So for instance Stracca lists fire, but only to mention the possibility that it could spread onboard 
because of the fault of the crew, without elaborating any further on the issue. Stracca, De 
Assecurationibus (note 40), gl. 18, fol. 109v, n. 2. 
112 See e.g. Pegas, Resolutiones forenses practicabiles (note 18), vol. 1, cap. 3, p. 99, n. 66: “At hoc 
intelligendum est in his, quae regulariter sine culpa accidere solent. Sicuti vis hostium, impetus 
acquarum, et similium: secus in his, qaue sine culpa regulariter euenire non solent, vt sunt furtum, 
incendium, mors non naturalis animalium, fuga seruorum ...”. Cf. e.g. Mascardus, Conclusiones 
Probationum Omnivm (note 25), vol. 1, concl. 271, pp. 446-447, n. 8-9: “Limita [scil., to exclude the need 
of full proof] ut procedant praestata in his casibus, qui sine culpa praecedente facile evenire non 
consueverunt, ut in furto, incendio, fuga servorum, vel aliorum, qui debuerunt custodiri secus in illis, 
qui sine culpa regulariter evenire solent, ut vis hostium, impetus aquarum, et similia, in quibus probata 
amissione, praesumitur casus, nisi culpa probetur”. See further Savelli, Summa Diversorum Tractatuum 
(note 65), vol. 1, lib. 1, s.v. Casus, p. 226, n. 6. Cf. ibid., s.v. Conductor, p. 370, n. 38. 
113 On the subject a particularly interesting decision was rendered by the Rota of Bologna (31.3.1656), 
because the bench refused to saddle the land-carrier with presumed fault despite that such was the 
expected outcome. The judges felt that, in the specific circumstances of the case, doing so would have 
amounted to imposing on the defendant an irrebuttable presumption of guilt, which they wanted to 
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overloading the mule led to the same presumed responsibility for the mishap as the 
overloading of the ship.114 By contrast, the institor (in fact, some sort of junior partner) 
who lost the fishing tackle at sea was presumptively not at fault: unlike the wind 
spreading the fire on land, the wind blowing at sea pointed to a fortuitus mishap.115 In 
such and many other instances, it was virtually irrelevant whether the defendant was 
under culpa levissima or levis. In either case he had to prove that he exercised a 
remarkably high level of diligence, and this in effect amounted to disproving the causal 
link between his behaviour and the mishap. 
 
Coming back to later jurists’ treatises, and contrasting them with the writing of 
medieval jurists, the compenetration between mishap and fault becomes evident.116 
Let us take for instance a rather banal – but revealing - observation of Anacletus 
Reiffenstuel (Johann Georg Reiffenstuel, 1641-1703). The defendant would not liable 
for casus fortuitous, says Reiffenstuel, unless the casus is the consequence of his faulty 
behaviour. The faulty behaviour leading to an otherwise fortuitous accident is qualified 
as culpa levissima. So far, the argument is the same as that of medieval jurists. The 
standard of care, however, is not determined on the basis of the contractual 
relationship (and so, in abstract terms) but rather according to the kind of mishap.117 
And this allows to dispense with specific proof as to the actual fault of the defendant: 
that is (presumptively) inferred from the nature of the mishap.118 The abstract rule is 
the same as that of the medieval commentators. Its application is not. The burden of 
proof now depends on the specific category of mishap, which conditions the 
                                                                          	
avoid “cum non debeat sola formalitas ordinis pervertere substantiam justitiae” (De Luca, Theatrum 
Veritatis et Justitiae (note 53), vol. 4, disc. 11, p. 14, n. 6). The decision was however reported precisely 
because it did the opposite of what the judges were supposed to do. It seems telling that, despite the 
great prestige of De Luca, this decision is very seldom quoted in other cases involving land-carriers. It 
would seem that it remained the occasional, isolated protest against the hardening of the presumption 
system. 
114 E.g. Carocius, Tractatvs Locati et Condvcti (note 9), pt. 2, s.v. Dolo et Culpa, fol. 51r, n. 8. Cf. supra, note 
88. 
115 De Luca, Theatrum Veritatis et Justitiae (note 53), vol. 4, disc. 13, p. 16, esp. n. 3-4 and 6. 
116 Later jurists are here meant as practice-oriented ones. The present work purportedly avoids any 
reference to those learned positions that had great importance as to the development of legal thought, 
but not as much to legal practice. Less practice-oriented jurists also started with a careful analysis of 
medieval schemes on fault, but then they started moving in directions as different as those, for 
instance, of Molina on the one hand and Donellus on the other. See e.g. N. Jansen, Die Struktur des 
Haftungsrechts (note 57), pp. 309-10, and ibid., pp. 304-5, together with H.-J. Hoffmann (note 20), pp.85-
86 respectively. A further and different direction was that taken by most humanist jurists, on whom 
see esp. the same Hoffmann, ult. cit., pp. 83-84 and 105-108. 
117 Reiffenstuel, Jus canonicum universum (note 25), vol. 3, p. 267, n. 62-63: “Ordinarie et regulariter loquendo; 
quia dantur casus, in quibus conductor etiam de culpa levissima, quin et de casu fortuito tenetur. Veluti 
primo, si expresse inter contrahentes conventum est de praestando damno quomodocumque, etiamsi 
culpa levissima ... Secundo de culpa levissima, et casu fortuito tenetur, si conductor sua culpa det 
causam casui fortuito, ut si in locatione v.g. convenit, Ignem non habeto, et habuit, tenebitur, etiamsi fortuitus 
casus admisit incendium; quia non debuit ignem habere” (italics in the text). 
118 Ibid., n. 69. Cf. e.g. Mascardus, Conclusiones Probationum Omnivm (note 25), vol. 1, concl. 468, p. 760, 
n. 6; Menochio, De arbitrariis judicum, quaestionibus et causis …, Genevae, 1690, sumptibus Samuelis de 
Tournes, lib. 2, cent. 4, casus 390, p. 710, n.6.  
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qualification of culpa.  
When fault is considered in isolation from the kind of mishap, early modern jurists 
writing on culpa levissima are still expected to follow the usual approach, and define it as 
a sort of extra-diligence. But if we were to go beyond definitions and look at the 
explanation provided as to its actual working, we could see fault explained in terms of 
(loose) causality.119 Just as for the bench, so for the jurists the question ultimately is 
whether the mishap could be ascribed – in an approximative, probabilistic way – to 
the behaviour of the defendant measured against a certain standard of care. The 
question thus becomes not one of definitions but of their practical application, which 
the jurists were happy to leave to the discretion of the judge - who could naturally 
avail himself of conjectures.120 While in principle those conjectures provided only 
some help in applying abstract principles, in practice they shaped the principles 
themselves. 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, this outcome is hardly surprising. Setting the bar too 
high has often the effect of encouraging ways to get around it. Establishing the 
presence of fault would have not been enough to condemn the defendant. In 
principle, the conductor should be found liable if his fault both preceeded and resulted 
in the mishap.121 As such, proving the pre-existing faulty state of the conductor could 
only amount to proving that his culpa pre-dated the occurrence of the mishap, not also 
that it caused it.122 To make up for that, legal presumptions both implied fault and 
entailed some causality link between fault and mishap.123  
The nuances between culpa levis in abstracto and levissima continued to occupy much 
room in theoretical discussions, but had a remarkably lesser impact on the actual 
position of the courts. Some events are not typically triggered by anyone’s fault, while 
others are. The specific kind of event leading to the actual loss or damage thus became 
                                                                          
119 See for instance the swift passage from definition to explanation of culpa levissima in the treatise of 
Celsus Bargalius (Celso Bargagli, 1546-1593), Celsi Bargalii … Tractatus … de Dolo et Culpa … in VI. 
Libros Distinctus …, Norimbergae, apud Joannem Danielem Tauberum, 1700, lib. 5, cap. 4 (De levissima 
Culpa), p. 454, n. 6: “Est deviatio a legis dispositione, in eo, quod Lex disponit, esse diligentissimam, 
veluti non diligentissime custodire rem tuae custodiae commissam ... aut non diligentissime curare 
infirmum, vel aliquid de contingentibus omittere, quod si non fuisset omissum, res verosimiliter salva 
foret”. 
120 Ibid., n. 7: “cum varia sit personarum condicio, certa regula in commissione levissimae culpae, non 
potest constitui; proinde relinquitur Arbitrio Judicis, qui ex circumstantiis, et conjecturis judicat, in 
quam quis culpam inciderit.” On the point see already Benedetto Capra (Benedictus de Benedictis de 
Perusio, d.1470), D. Benedicti de Benedictis de Capra … Conclvsionvm, Regvlarvm, Tractatuum, et Communium 
opinionum … Venetiis, 1568, vol. 1, reg. 78, fol. 96r, n. 29: “in istis non potest tradi certa theorica … 
relinquendum est iudicis arbitrio, qui ex circunstantiis et coniecturis habebit iudicare in qua culpa quis 
fuerit.” 
121 Carocius’ treatise on locatio-conductio is particularly clear on the point: Tractatvs Locati et Condvcti (note 
9) pt. 2, s.v. Casibus, et periculis, fol. 53r, n. 8. 
122 Ibid., fol. 53r, n. 9. 
123 On the point, Pacioni is perhaps clearer: the locator cannot just prove that the conductor put some 
heavy bags on the horse, but that the horse died because of that burden. To prove that, is it necessary to 
provide (what we might consider as) strong circumstancial evidence, such as proof that the cargo was 
not well secured, or that it was too heavy, and so on. Pacioni, De Locatione et Condvctione Tractatvs (note 
13) cap. 12, p. 76, n. 74. 
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the starting point for the court’s approach on the whole matter. A proper casus fortuitus 
is that which cannot be prevented because it cannot be foreseen - and so, by 
definition, it does not depend on any faulty behaviour (whether of a very diligent or of 
an extremely diligent person). If a casus fortuitus does occur, the burden of proof is on 
the counterparty: the shipmaster does not have to prove his diligence, it is the 
counterparty that has to prove the shipmaster’s negligence. In practice, for instance, a 
captain would not have to explain why the ship was attacked by pirates, even if 
avoiding that encounter could have well been possible. By contrast, a captain would 
have to exculpate himself in case of theft onboard. 
While a casus fortuitus was presumed to have occurred without any fault, by contrast, 
other mishaps were presumptively considered as depending on someone’s fault. This 
is something that ought to be taken into account when thinking of the maxim that 
(barring custodia or mora) culpa is never presumed but always to be proven. It is not an 
inversion in the burden of proof with regard to culpa, but a presumption of causality 
that implies a similar presumption of faulty or negligent behaviour. Before looking at 
the standard of care applicable to the defendant in the specific situation, the court 
would normally look at the kind of mishap. The division of mishaps between 
“presumptively faultless loss” and “presumptively faulty loss” thus came before the 
division between “fault presumed” and “fault to be proven”. If the casus was deemed 
to be fortuitus, the master would be presumed not to have been at fault, and it would 
be up to the plaintiff to prove otherwise.124 Even if one were to insist that culpa 
levissima entailed an inversion in the burden of proof - something, in court practice, far 
from clear - its practical significance was minimal.  
On a practical level, the priority given to the nature of the mishap did not induce 
the bench to disregard the standard of care required of the defendant (at least, not in 
principle), but to simplify its ascertaining. In a maritime context this was perhaps more 
evident than elsewhere: on the one hand, the judges lacked specific nautical expertise; 
on the other, the amount of information as to the circumstances of the mishap was 
often limited.125 Both reasons encouraged the bench to apply a common sense 
judgment. Quite evidently, this approach did not necessarily follow a rigorous analysis 
in terms of causation, but rather looked at the conduct of the shipmaster on the basis 
of the kind of mishap occurred.126 Whether levis or levissima, therefore, the shipmaster’s 
                                                                          
124 E.g. Marliani, Decisiones Avreae, et Peregrinae (note 83), dec. 91, p. 257, n. 13; Iosephus Ramonius 
(Josep Ramón, d.1631), Consiliorvm vna cvm Sententiis et Decisionibvs Audientiae Regiae Principatus Cathaloniae. 
Avctore Iosepho Ramonio ..., Barcinonae, ex Typographia Stephani Liberos, Expensis Michaelis Manescal, 
1628, vol. 1, cons. 39, p. 450, n. 4; Girolamo Basilico (d.1670), Decisiones Criminales Magnae Regiae Curiae 
Regni Siciliae ..., Authore D. Hieronymo Basilico ... (2nd edn.), Florentiae, Ex Typhographia Joannis Philippi 
Cecchi, 1691, dec. 18, p. 230, n. 7; Balducci, Decisiones et Res Judicatae (note 108), 1703, vol. 1, tit. 1, dec. 
10, p. 28, n. 19. 
125 Not to mention that relying on the culpa levissima of one party would make sense only when the 
other party was not under the same degree of care. So for instance when the mishap was a collision 
between two ships, to apportion liability the court required clear evidence, moving from the 
“standard” burden of proof. See e.g. Antonius da Gama (1520-1595), Decisiones Svpremi Senatvs Regni 
Lvsitaniae, Auctore D. Antonio De Gamma ..., Barcinone: excudebatur apud Gabrielem Graells & 
Gerardum Dotil, expensis Lelij Marini mercatoris Veneti, 1597, dec. 296, p. 293. 
126 It goes without saying that the presumptions developed by the courts were hardly limited to a 
maritime context.  
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diligence was assessed against the nature of the mishap.127 If the mishap was classified 
as presumptively fortuitous, ascertaining that the master followed the standard 
behaviour to be normally expected (which is something very different from proving a 
remarkably high standard of diligence) was sufficient as to reject any causal link with 
the mishap.128  
Qualifying the mishap before moving on to the standard of care of the defendant 
was of great practical significance: in examining the conduct of the shipmaster, the 
courts would be moving from a (strong) presumption about the nature of the mishap. 
Thus, if the mishap was typically fortuitous, then the judges would condemn the 
shipmaster only in presence of clear evidence pointing to a remarkably negligent 
behaviour and, especially, to its direct link with the mishap.129 By contrast, if the 
mishap fell within one of the categories where the loss was considered as 
presumptively caused by fault, then the judges would normally move from the 
assumption that it was imputable to the shipmaster’s conduct. In such a case, while 
still in principle requiring ordinatio culpae ad casum, the bench often considered the mere 
possibility that the behaviour could have led to the mishap as sufficient to envisage 
causality, and so to find for the occurence of that ordinatio.130  
 
To fully appreciate the practical strength of legal presumptions, it is also important 
to keep in mind a rather banal fact: the growing number of commercial disputes heard 
by law courts made very difficult for the judges to specialise in any single branch of 
commercial law. This led to the increasing reliance on abstract, sometimes generic 
guidelines, and - crucially - their progressive crystallisation into fully-fledged legal 
presumptions. In turn, the growing weight of previous decisions made increasingly 
difficult to challenge them.  
This last point, although not always fully appreciated, is of particular importance. 
The more decisions were rendered by a same court, the more such court would rely 
on its own jurisprudence. This is especially evident in the Italian case law during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. At first, in the second half of the sixteenth 
                                                                          
127 Ultimately, therefore, the result was the same whether the chosen approach was the benchmark of 
professional diligence or the more dogmatic category of higher standards of care imposed by the law 
for specific kinds of obligations. Both approaches can boast illustrious pedigrees: cf. H.-J. Hoffmann 
(note 20), pp. 50-51.  
128 Among the many examples that could be made, see e.g. a case of the Genoese mercantile Rota 
reported in Bellonius, Decisiones Rotae Genvae de Mercatvra (note 83), dec. 205, fol. 265r-v, n. 2, on the 
shipmaster’s liability for the damage to the cargo following a sea storm. The court simply looked at 
whether the cargo was duly stored under the hatches: as that was the case, it found for the shipmaster.  
129 So for instance when the shipmaster’s negligence appeared blatant, and - especially - its causality 
link with the mishap rather obvious, then the bench would find against him even if the mishap was 
one normally classified as fortuitous. Suffices for instance to think of failure to repair the vessel until it 
would eventually sink. In such and similar cases the courts had little qualms in condemning the 
shipmaster. See e.g. Casaregis, Discursus Legales de Commercio (note 8), vol. 1, p. 47, n. 7-8 (vol. 1, p. 91, 
in the first edition of 1719). 
130 E.g. Sforza degli Oddi (1540-1611), Consiliorvm sive Responsorvm, D. Sfortiae Oddi Pervsini ... Venetiis, 
apud Iunctas, 1593, lib. 1, cons. 31 (a decision of the Florentine Rota of the late sixteenth century), fol. 
95v, n. 34: “licet culpa non esset praecise necessario ad casum ordinata, sufficit tamen quod secundum 
possibilitatem ipsius actus dicatur ordinata ad casum, idest, quod possibile sit quod ex illa causa ille 
effectus secutus fuerit”. 
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century, the particular nature of a court such as the Genoese Rota Mercatoria (whose 
judges were neither sailors nor merchants, but at least had a robust understanding of 
mercantile business) made its decisions particularly important for other courts to 
follow. In the space of a few decades, however, those other courts began to issue an 
increasing number of decisions on mercantile matters themselves. The more they 
could rely on their own jurisprudence, the less they would still base their decisions on 
those of the Genoese Rota to decide upon a case.131 
Further, the illustrious provenance of those presumptions - many were taken from 
Roman law sources132 - often discouraged their critical elaboration. Roman law 
provided, so to say, both the diagnosis and the treatment: there was little incentive to 
look beyond it.133 So the law courts began to use their presumptions as a sort of 
checklist at the same time as they started to consolidate a rather strict observance of 
their precedents (or, at least, to find increasingly difficult, or just less expedient, 
departing from them). The growing appetite of court practice for presumptions 
encouraged jurists to invoke Roman law sources whenever such presumptions could 
be found. Taken out of their context, however, those sources were sometimes twisted 
beyond repair.134 It was a vicious circle. Thus, the legacy of Roman law proved 
ultimately more of a hindrance than a help to the evolution of the maritime carrier’s 
liability - and sometimes, perhaps, of commercial law at large.135  
 
2.5. Burden of proof and kind of mishap 
 
To appreciate the actual impact of presumptions on the burden of proof as to the 
defendant’s fault, a good example on our subject comes from a decision of the Roman 
Rota of 1705. Because of some difficulties in fetching wheat, the ship that was 
supposed to carry it had to wait until winter to set sail. Upon departure, the ship was 
spoiled by privateers. The insurers of the wheat refused to pay alleging that the 
shipmaster was at fault for the late departure, and so claiming that the mishap ought 
                                                                          
131 This of course does not mean that the decisions of the Genoese Rota were entirely disregarded, but 
that they became progressively just one among many different authorities that could, on occasion, be 
invoked in support of the court’s own jurisprudence. Cf. Carlo Delle Site, La Sacra Rota Romana e le sue 
decisioni in materia commerciale nel XVII secolo, unpublished PhD thesis, Università degli Studi di Milano, 
2012, pp. 119-120. 
132 Supra, text and note 109. 
133 Of course there were also subtler examples in legal literature. Suffices to think of the position of 
Scaccia, Tractatus de Commerciis et Cambio (note 109), § 1, q. 1, p. 38, n. 139-140. However, precisely 
because of their sophisticated nature (both in point of law and of fact), such examples were not 
entirely suitable to a judge not particularly expert in navigation, for their specialised nature made 
somewhat more difficult to apply them by analogy to other cases. This is why general and abstract 
cases were so popular: they were easy to follow. 
134 A particularly remarkable example is the treatment of Modestinus (D.27.1.10.3, esp. “quis regressus 
est rectam viam tenens”) at the hands of Mattheus de Vicq, in his edition of the treatise on averages of 
Quintyn Weitsen (1518-1565), in the attempt to find a foothold in Roman sources for contemporary 
principles on change of route and liability of the shipmaster. Mattheus de Vicq, in Tractatus de Avariis ... 
Compositus per Quintinum Weitsen ..., Amstelodami, apud Henricum et Theodorum Boom, 1672, cap. 29, 
s.v. De cursu, p. 109, note 32. 
135 Clearly, the issues just mentioned in this paragraph may not be dealt with in the present work. See 
again G. Rossi, The Big Divide (note 7). 
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to be presumptively ascribed to the conduct of the master (since he was also the 
insured). The master however managed to persuade the court of his reasons for the 
late departure, and so he was absolved. The encounter with pirates and privateers was 
typically qualified as casus fortuitus: in principle, the shipmaster should not have proven 
the absence of fault in his conduct. On the contrary, it should have been up to the 
insurers to prove both his fault and how did such fault result in the mishap. But the 
defendant was already under presumptive culpa for late departure, since sailing in 
wintertime was, from Santerna onwards,136 one of the traditional cases in which the 
mishap was presumptively ascribed to the shipmaster’s fault.137 The reason why such a 
case was considered as implying the reversal of the burden of proof (forcing the 
master to exculpate himself) was the strong correlation between winter navigation and 
the encounter with a sea-storm leading to the shipwreck. Clearly, there was no 
correlation between winter navigation and pirates or privateers (in fact, such unwanted 
encounters were less likely to happen during winter). But once the wrongful behaviour 
crystallised into a presumption of culpa, the rationale behind it was no longer much 
relevant. As such, in order to disprove his fault for having been attacked by privateers, 
the shipmaster had to explain to the court the problems he had encountered in 
fetching his cargo of wheat.138 
By contrast, when the fault of the shipmaster did not fall within the scope of a 
specific presumption, law courts were rather strict in requiring the plaintiff to prove a 
clear and direct causality link between fault and mishap. So, for instance, less than two 
years after the above decision, the same Roman Rota absolved another shipmaster 
whose vessel had been spoiled by pirates. In this case, the alleged fault of the master 
was the failure to procure sufficient licence to export the cargo. The causal link 
between the lack of valid licence and the aggression by pirates was the same as that 
between sailing in wintertime and being attacked by privateers - none. But the 
difference lay in that, unlike winter navigation, the lack of licence (so long as it did not 
amount to smuggling) was not one of the consolidated categories where the fault of 
the master was presumed.139  
 
If the presence of a presumption of causality had clear and strong consequences as 
to the defendant’s probatory position, one would expect fault to acquire a more 
central role in the absence of such presumptions. In case of a mishap not falling in any 
of the categories where fault was presumed or presumptively excluded, therefore, one 
might reasonably expect to find more elaborate discussions on the actual culpa levissima 
of the shipmaster. That, however, is not necessarily the case. Let us take for instance 
the case of the change of route. In principle, especially in Mediterranean policies, it 
                                                                          
136 Santerna, De Assecurationibus (note 90), pt. 3, fols. 35v-36r, n. 46-48. 
137 Further, delaying departure was itself – at least presumptively – faulty behaviour. As Pegas had it, 
doing so was contrary to the “stylus viagii”. Pegas, Resolutiones forenses practicabiles (note 18), vol. 1, cap. 
3, p. 96, n. 43. 
138 Sacrae Rotae Romanae Decisiones nuperrimae ... Romae, apud Simonem Occhi, 1763, vol. 9 (1705-1706), 
dec. 82 (29.4.1705), esp. pp. 129-130, n. 6. 
139 Sacrae Rotae Romanae Decisiones Coram R.mo P. Domino Cyriaco Lancetta ..., Romae, Typis, et sumptibus 
Hieronimi Maynardi, 1732, vol. 2, dec. 481 (4.4.1707), p. 282, n. 7. 
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was customary to grant broad discretion to the shipmaster as to the route to follow.140 
As such, only an extravagant route could be qualified as change of voyage - triggering 
therefore the termination of the policy -,141 not to mention that the burden to prove as 
much would lie on the plaintiff.142 On a practical level, the main issue was whether the 
change of route made the navigation more dangerous: if the shipmaster changed 
route, avoiding the one routinely followed by similar vessels, and met with an accident 
along the new route, should the loss or damage be presumptively imputed to him? On 
the point there was no specific reference in Roman law, but trading the ordinary route 
for an unknown one was generally considered faulty behaviour of the conductor in land-
carriage.143 Sea-trade therefore followed suit.144 Even so, changing route was 
sometimes necessary at sea, much more than it was on land. So, beginning with 
Santerna and Stracca,145 many jurists insisted on the fact that the master was not at 
fault when the change of voyage was due to some necessity.146 But that was not the 
same as saying that, unless the necessity was proven beyond doubt, then the 
shipmaster was presumptively liable for the mishap. Further, the distinction between 
necessity and utility is a fine one, and no jurist sought to distinguish the two fully - 
provided that it was possible at all. The boundaries between necessary, prudential, and 
potentially beneficial change of voyage remained blurred. 
If the culpa levissima of the shipmaster entailed the inversion of the burden of proof, 
then in case of mishap following the change of route, one would expect the courts to 
                                                                          
140 A widespread custom was to add in the insurance policy the clause allowing the ship to proceed in 
any direction (“to the left, right, north and south, back and forth, once or more times”). Given this 
kind of discretion, only an extravagant route would trigger a clear change of voyage - and therefore the 
termination of the policy. 
141 The issue is discussed in some lengths in Casaregis, Discursus Legales de Commercio (note 8), vol. 2, 
disc. 69, pp. 216-223 (vol. 2, pp. 103-104, in the first edition of 1719), where ample sources. 
142 See esp. Bellonius, Decisiones Rotae Genvae de Mercatvra (note 83), dec. 3, fol. 18r, n. 11. Indeed the few 
known cases in which the mercantile Rota of Genoa avoided the policy because of the change of 
voyage were rather adamant scenarios where the shipmaster had just decided to change the voyage 
agreed upon with a wholly different one (ibid., dec. 40, fols. 120v-121r, n. 1-2, and esp. dec. 63, fol. 138v, 
n. 1-3). See also Johannes Wamesius (Jean Wamese, 1524-1590), Responsorum sive Consiliorum ad ius 
forumque civile pertinentium, Antverpiae, apud Henricum Aertssens, 1651, cent. 4, cons. 24 (undated, but 
on an insurance policy of December 1566), pp. 64-65, n. 5-6 and 8. 
143 E.g. Pacioni, De Locatione et Condvctione Tractatvs (note 13), cap. 12, p. 77, n. 82: “adscribitur etiam 
culpae conductoris ad vecturam, si mutauit viam solitam, et iuit per insolitam, ita vt inde aliquod 
infortunium successerit, vti si inciderit in Latrones, qui animal conductum abstulerint, vel animal 
corruens obierit”. 
144 See - inter multos - that veritable collection of common places that is the treatise of Julius Ferrettus 
(Giulio Ferretti, 1480-1547), Ivlii Ferretti ... De Iure, et Re Nauali ..., Venetiis, apud Franciscum de 
Franciscis Senensem, 1579, lib. 12, fols. 123v-124r, n. 118. Ultimately, such presumptions were the 
application to a particular context of other and similarly generic presumptions thought for “standard” 
locatio-conductio situations: see e.g. Savelli, Summa Diversorum Tractatuum (note 65), lib. 1, s.v. Conductor, p. 
372, n. 59. Northern European writers were no different: see e.g. Loccenius, De Jure Maritimo et Navali 
Libri Tres (note 107), lib. 1, cap. 7, n. 3, pp. 63-64. 
145 Santerna, De Assecurationibus (note 90), pt. 3, fols. 37v-38r, n. 54; Stracca, De Assecurationibus (note 40), 
gl. 14, fol. 99r-v, n. 3. 
146 See for all Hevia Bolaño, Laberinto de Comercio Terrestre y Naval (note 41), lib. 3, cap. 14, p. 657, n. 22; 
Weitsen, Tractatus de Avariis (note 134), cap. 29, pp. 106-107, and esp. cap. 30, p. 111; Loccenius, De 
Jure Maritimo et Navali Libri Tres (note 107), lib. 2, cap. 5, p. 178, n. 10. 
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ask the master to disculpate himself. Much on the contrary, reading early modern 
decisions on maritime litigation, one is struck by the conspicuously rare occasions in 
which the court actually condemned the shipmaster for such changes.147 In the vast 
majority of cases the master was acquitted - without any particular effort of the 
defendant in exculpating himself. By and large, law courts were inclined to accept his 
explanation for the events. This was not because the courts progressively relaxed the 
standard of care of culpa levissima, but rather because the change of route never 
crystallised into one of the categories of presumed culpa ad casum ordinata. The 
shipmaster might have been considered presumptively at fault, but there was no 
similar presumption about the causal link between that fault and the mishap. If the 
decision to change the route – not due to some necessity – depended on the free will 
of the defendant, then such a will could be construed as culpa casum dans only if leading 
directly to the mishap.148 The focus on causality attracted within it also the issue of 
fault. As a result, the burden of proof on fault was not kept distinct from that on 
causation. Having to prove the immediate causal link between the defendant’s conduct 
and the ensuing loss, the plaintiff was implicitly also expected to prove the defendant’s 
fault, or at least to advance strong arguments in that direction. When the behaviour of 
the defendant did not match any of the typical conducts likely leading to mishap, in 
other words, the need of direct causality between faulty behaviour and loss required to 
prove them both.149 Thus, if the culpa of the defendant had to be the causa immediata of 
the mishap, the courts in effects required the plaintiff to prove a sort of culpa immediata 
in the defendant. 
To sum up, the classification (and crystallisation) of different kinds of mishap into 
discrete categories, where the fault was presumed and presumedly held as cause of the 
                                                                          
147 One of such - very rare – occasions is a decision of the Senate of Lisbon of 30.8.1679, which 
sustained the decision of the lower court (of 21.1.1679) and confirmed the condemnation of the 
shipmaster. In that case, however, the shipmaster did not (or could not) provide any plausible 
explanation for his actions. Pegas, Resolutiones forenses practicabiles (note 18), pt. 1, cap. 3, pp. 96-97, n. 43. 
148 So for instance on 23.9.1620 the Regia Audientia of Barcelona quashed the decision of the lower 
court (the mercantile consulate of Cagliari), which had found for the insurers, and condemned them to 
pay for the loss. For the Audientia, the decision to change route (i.e. arriving in Tarragona instead of 
Valentia) was not the causa immediata of the mishap (the encounter with some Mauritanian pirates). 
Ramonius, Consiliorum una cum sententiis (note 124), vol. 1, 1628, cons. 39, esp. pp. 450-451, n. 4-6. The 
issue was also about whether the change of route for the second leg of the journey (Portupalla to 
Barcelona and thence to Valencia) would terminate the insurance, and the Barcelona court argued that, 
since Tarragona was in the way from Barcelona to Valencia, the change of route entailed simply a 
shortening and not a change of the voyage. Shortly thereafter, the highest court (the Supremum 
Aragonum Concilium) confirmed the appellate decision (ibid., pp. 454-455). The case is also amply 
discussed in Casaregis, Discursus Legales de Commercio (note 8), vol. 1, disc. 67, pp. 211-215 (vol. 2, pp. 
95-100, in the 1719 edition). 
149 Ramonius, last note, cons. 39, p. 450, n. 4 and 6: “etiamsi magister nauis iussu domini mercium, vel 
eius institoris Tarraconam tantum accedere decreuisset, ibique exonerare merces, earum iactura, nec 
nautae, nec dominis est imputandis, neque propterea assecuratores absoluendi sunt, quoties enim 
alicuius culpae casus qui evenit adscribitur, necessario demonstrandum est culpam illam ad casum qui 
evenit fuisse dispositam atque ordinatam, ita vt nisi propter eam culpam casus haud quaquam fuisset 
eventurus ... cum igitur praetensum mandatum accedendi Tarraconam non sit causa immediata 
submersionis atque naufragij, et eo sequato nihilominus casus euinisset eodem modo quo fuit 
subsequutus, quia eadem, et non alia nauigatione nauis fuisset profectura, si nulla Tarraconae vrbis 
habita cogitatione Valentiam petijsset, calumniosa est assecuratorum exceptio”. 
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mishap, strongly encouraged thinking of fault and causation together. If their 
combined analysis led to the aggravation of the burden of proof of the defendant 
where the case fell within one of such kinds of mishap, it also alleviated his probatory 
onus when that was not the case.  
 
2.6. A practical note: how to prove the mishap 
 
To conclude this short analysis on the liability of the shipmaster in early modern 
civil practice, having stressed the importance of the qualification of mishaps into 
presumptively fault-based and faultless categories, we might want to spend some 
words on what did actually happen in case of mishap.  
Following a mishap, the master had to report it before the closest court to the 
place where the mishap took place. In most cases, this meant that the court had no 
jurisdiction on any litigation related to the mishap. Nonetheless, the mishap had to be 
duly reported and (to some extent) proven before the local judges. If satisfied as to the 
evidence brought forth, the local court would qualify the mishap as a casus fortuitus, for 
which the shipmaster would - at least, presumptively - not be considered res-
ponsible.150 In a typical scenario, the court would be hundreds of miles away from the 
place where the charter-party (and the possible insurance policy) was made. So, 
proving the mishap before a iudex incompetens meant that any counterparty (especially 
merchant consignor and/or insurers) would not be notified - unless of course the 
court were close enough to the place of their residence.151 Nonetheless, the attestation 
of the court as to the occurrence - and, crucially, the nature - of the mishap was 
perfectly valid, and it would be used in any future litigation on that case (and so, in any 
                                                                          
150 The practice is attested with remarkable uniformity. Just to give some examples (hardly exhaustive - 
the list would be much longer), for the Council of Flanders see a consilium of Wamesius, Responsorum sive 
Consiliorum (note 142), 1651, cent. 4, cons. 24, p. 65, n. 4 (on an insurance policy of December 1566). 
For the position of the Neapolitan Sacro Consiglio see Hector Capycius Latrus (Ettore Capecelatro, 
1580-1654), Decisiones Novissimae Sacri Reg. Cons. Neap. ... Neapoli, 1640, typis Iacobi Gaffari, sumptibus 
Io. Dominici Bove, dec. 60 (16.11.1637), p. 258, n. 2-3. For the Rota of Florence see Artimini, Raccolta 
delle Decisioni della Ruota Fiorentina dal 1700 al 1808 (note 110), vol. 2, 1837, dec. 197 (28.1.1708), p. 955, 
n. 21-23, and vol. 3, 1838, dec. 205 (10.5.1709), pp. 24-25, n. 11. These two decisions are also reported 
in Jacobus de Comitibus (Giacomo Conti, 1668-1738), Iacobi de Comitibus ... Decisiones Inclitae Rotae 
Senensis et Florentinae ..., Florentiae, ex Typographia Bonducciana, vol. 2, pt. 1, 1725, dec. 61, pp. 6-7, n. 
21-23, and dec. 64, p. 27, n. 11 respectively. For Rome see Sacrae Rotae Romanae Decisionum Recentiorum a 
Joanne Baptista Compagno J.C. Romano selectarum, Venetiis, apud Paulum Balleonium, 1716, vol. 19, pt. 1 
(1677-1678), dec. 369 (20.5.1673), p. 428, n. 15-16; ibid., vol. 19, pt. 2 (1673-1683), dec. 447 
(13.6.1674), p. 50, n. 2; Sacrae Rotae Romanae Decisiones nuperrimae (note 138), vol. 1 (1684-1686), dec. 239 
(4.7.1685), p. 375, n. 4; Decisiones Sacrae Rotae Romanae coram R.P.D. Ansaldo de Ansaldis ..., Romae, Typis 
Reu. Camerae Apostolicae, 1711, dec. 41 (28.4.1698), p. 245, n. 5. For the mercantile Rota of Genoa 
see Balducci, Decisiones et Res Judicatae (note 108), vol. 1, tit. 1, dec. 7 (21.3.1697), p. 18, n. 2-3. Cf. 
Stracca, De Assecurationibus (note 40), gl. 28, fols. 121v-122r, n. 2; Hevia Bolaño, Laberinto de Comercio 
Terrestre y Naval (note 41), lib. 3, cap. 12, pp. 634-635, n. 32; Roccus, De Navibus et Navlo (note 41), not. 
95, p. 383, n. 244. For an overview of the later practice (mainly, second half of the eighteenth century) 
see Domenico Azuni (1749-1827), Dizionario Universale Ragionato della Giurisprudenza Mercantile del Sig. 
Senatore Dn. D. A. Azuni …, vol. 3 (2nd edn.), Livorno, Glauco Masi, 1822, s.v. Naufragio, p. 101, n. 16. 
151 See esp. Sacrae Rotae Romanae Decisionum Recentiorum a Joanne Baptista Compagno ... selectarum (note 150), 
vol. 19, pt. 1 (1677-1678), dec. 369 (20.5.1673), p. 427, n. 12-13, and Savelli, Summa Diversorum 
Tractatuum (note 65), vol. 1, lib. 1, s.v. Assecuratio, p. 163, n. 11, and s.v. Casus, pp. 226-227, n. 6. 
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dispute with the same merchant consignor or insurers not notified of the depositions 
taken before that court). Indeed, far from challenging the competence of a court to 
issue such an attestation, the plaintiff might challenge the fact that the court was not 
the closest to the actual place of mishap, but just a relatively close one. Although the 
accusation was typically dismissed (for the simple reason that the survivors of a 
shipwreck could not be expected to be too choosy as to where exactly to go once 
landed ashore),152 the fact that it was levied would seem to confirm the validity of such 
attestations, and especially their actual role in exonerating the master. Thus, the 
attestation ultimately fed into the system of presumptions elaborated by the courts. 
Indeed, it is not only attested for maritime carriage law but also for land carriage, and 
even for the simple hiring out of mules that died along the way.153  
In evaluating the evidence and qualifying the mishap, the court enjoyed remarkable 
discretion. This qualification process did not encompass just the most obvious 
scenarios - for instance, deciding on whether a pirate attack did effectively take place 
or not.154 It could well extend to somewhat more sophisticated questions (with 
considerable impact on related issues, especially on insurance), such as whether the 
mishap was to be considered as utter loss of the vessel or only serious damage to it,155 
or whether the ship became unseaworthy during the navigation or it was such ab 
initio.156  
                                                                          
152 E.g. Sacrae Rotae Romanae Decisiones nuperrimae (note 138), vol. 1 (1684-1686), dec. 239 (4.7.1685), p. 
375, n. 5-7; Balducci, Decisiones et Res Judicatae (note 108), vol. 1, tit. 1, dec. 8 (28.6.1697), p. 20, n. 8-10. 
The point is particularly clear in the decision of the Florentine civil Rota of 28.1.1708, reported in 
Artimini, Raccolta delle Decisioni della Ruota Fiorentina dal 1700 al 1808 (note 110), vol. 2, 1837, dec. 197, p. 
955, n. 23, and in Iacobi de Comitibus ... Deciiones Inclitae Rotae Senensis et Florentinae (note 150), vol. 2, pt. 1, 
1725, dec. 61, p. 7, n. 23, where the shipmaster should have in theory approached the authorities in 
Malaga (for the shipwreck happened in the open sea near that city) but he was able to reach the shore 
only in proximity to Cadiz.  
153 Ripoll, Variae iuris resolutiones (note 49), cap. 12, p. 392, n. 125-128. In such a case the conductor had to 
explain the mishap to the court and, where possible, to produce witness testimony as to the fortuitous 
nature of the mishap.  
154 E.g. Sacrae Rotae Romanae Decisiones nuperrimae (note 138), vol. 3 (1690-1692), 1752, dec. 279 
(13.6.1692), p. 356, n. 3. 
155 See for instance a lengthy dispute taking place before the Neapolitan Sacro Consiglio starting in the 
early 1620s and concluding only with a decision of 29.1.1634, reported in Giovanni Francesco 
Sanfelice (1566-1648), D.D. Joan. Franc. Sanfelicii ... Decisionum Supremorum Tribunalium Regni Neapolitani, 
Neapoli, sumptibus Nicolai, et Vincentij Rispoli, 1733, vol. 2, dec. 162, pp. 8-9. See also a decision of 
the Florentine civil Rota of 16.12.1678, in Decisiones Inclytae Rotae Florentinae (note 29), dec. 25, pp. 138-
139, n. 8-9. A subject where the bench had particularly broad discretion was that of insurance after 
loss, for the court was called to pronunce on whether the insured had knowledge of the mishap prior 
to the signature of the policy - which would lead to the invalidity of the insurance. See esp. a decision 
of the Genoese mercantile Rota on the validity of a reinsurance policy (of 17.11.1668 - the original 
policy was of 7.4.1668), where the bench claimed to possess a particularly broad discretion in 
evaluating the facts of the case. The decision is reported by Flaminio Armenzani, Decisiones Almae Rotae 
Civilis Ser.me Reipvblicae Genvensis Cum aliquis Lucensibus, Avctore Excell.mo D. Flaminio Armenzano ..., Aesii, 
ex Typographia Episcopali, apud Claudium Percimineum, 1679, dec. 31, p. 108, n. 2-3. 
156 A particularly detailed example can be found in a decision of the Florentine Rota of the late 
eighteenth century, in Selectae Almae Rotae Florentinae Decisiones, Florentiae, ex Typographia Jacobi 
Gratiolii, vol. 1, pt. 1, 1790, dec. 46 (15.7.1785). A ship insured for the voyage London-Salonicco 
became unseaworthy near Algarve. The shipmaster went before the local consulate (of Villanova de 
Portiman), which examined three sailors and the pilot of the ship, as well as the shipmaster of another 
Historia et ius - ISSN 2279-7416 www.historiaetius.eu - 12/2017 - paper 12 
 35	
To reach its decision, the court would normally hear the deposition of some 
members of the crew or passengers onboard (two at least, possibly three),157 or other 
witnesses.158 For obvious reasons of impartiality, whenever possible passengers were 
preferred to members of the crew.159 By the same token, the deposition of the 
shipmaster himself was normally discouraged (as he had all the incentive to have the 
mishap qualified as casus fortuitus).160 Nonetheless, in absence of other witnesses, the 
notoriety of the mishap would typically corroborate the shipmaster’s deposition.161 
The requirement that the court be close to the place of the mishap had a clear logic: in 
many cases, its proximity was sufficient to ensure the presence of some witnesses of 
the mishap, or at least of flotsam and shipwrecked survivors.162 Failing that, and 
                                                                          	
vessel as impartial eyewitness of the mishap. Satisfied by their depositions, the consulate agreed with 
the shipmaster’s account and stated that the ship, being initially seaworthy, had become unable to 
continue her voyage only after departure (thereby confirming the validity of the insurance policy), ibid., 
pp. 453-455. Nonetheless, the insurers declined their liability and were absolved by the court of 
Leghorn (the Tribunale del Governo di Livorno) on 11.3.1784. The insured appealed before the Consuls of 
the Sea (Consoli del Mare) of Pisa, who quashed the first decision and, relying on the report of the 
Consulate of of Villanova, condemned the insurers. The Consuls’ decision was then upheld by the 
Florentine Rota with a long and detailed decision. Its interest lies mainly in the fact that the local court 
which ruled on the qualification of the mishap (the Consulate of Villanova) had not provided for an 
expert examination (peritia), which in doubtful cases (such as the present one) was customary. 
Therefore, all that the impartial eyewitness (the shipmaster of another vessel) was able to say was that 
the vessel was indeed unseaworthy, but not whether the unseaworthiness was supervening or the ship 
was in no condition of sailing from the very beginning. Nonetheless, the Villanova Consulate 
pronounced for a specific kind of mishap (supervening unseaworthiness of the vessel), and the 
Florentine Rota found that the first decision (that which sided with the insurers) could not have 
ignored or even questioned the soundness of the Consulate’s judgment (ibid., esp. pp. 464-470). 
157 E.g. Roccus, De Navibus, et Navlo (note 41), not. 95, p. 383, n. 245. For Florence see Artimini, 
Raccolta delle Decisioni della Ruota Fiorentina dal 1700 al 1808 (note 110), vol. 2, 1837, dec. 197 (28.1.1708), 
pp. 953-4, n. 20; de Comitibus, Decisiones Inclitae Rotae Senensis et Florentinae (note 150), vol. 2, pt. 1, 
1725, dec. 61, p. 6, n. 20. For Rome see esp. Sacrae Rotae Romanae Decisionum Recentiorum a Joanne 
Baptista Compagno ... selectarum (note 150), vol. 19, pt. 1 (1677-1678), 1716, dec. 369 (20.5.1673), p. 428, 
n. 18-19 and n. 26-27. For Naples cf. in particular Capycius Latrus, Decisiones Novissimae Sacri Reg. Cons. 
Neap (note 150), dec. 60 (16.11.1637), p. 258, n. 4. 
158 Again, when possible, two or three at least: Sacrae Rotae Romanae Decisiones nuperrimae (note 138), vol. 
1 (1684-1686), 1751, dec. 239 (4.7.1685), pp. 374-375, n. 3. 
159 See esp. De Luca Theatrum Veritatis et Justitiae (note 53), vol. 8, disc. 111, p. 192, n. 2: “quamvis in 
hac materia probationum, certa, et determinata regula dari non valeat cum sit reposita in Judicis 
prudenti arbitrio, ex facti qualitate, ac singulorum casuum circumstantis regulanda; Potissime circa 
fidem nautis praestandam, an agant de se exonerando, vel etiam de exculpando ducem, seu dominum 
navis, cujus sunt famuli, cum similibus circumstantiis, quae possint eorum fidem minuere, et an sit 
species probationis quae etiam per alios testes non suspectos haberi valeat”. 
160 On the point see in particular a very widely quoted decision of the late sixteenth century rendered 
by the Genoese mercantile Rota, reported in Bellonius, Decisiones Rotae Genvae de Mercatvra (note 83), 
dec. 3, fol. 19r, n. 17. 
161 Lorenzo Cantini and Domenico Nenci, Tesoro del Foro Toscano, ossia Raccolta delle Decisioni del Supremo 
Consiglio e delle Regie Ruote Civili delle Prime Appellazioni di Toscana, Florence, Stamperia del Giglio, vol. 14, 
1825, Rota of Pisa, dec. 4 (24.8.1833), pp. 26-27, n. 1. 
162 See esp. Bellonius, Decisiones Rotae Genvae de Mercatvra (note 83), dec. 3, fol. 19r, n. 17, and Sacrae Rotae 
Romanae Decisionum Recentiorum a Joanne Baptista Compagno ... selectarum (note 150), vol. 19, pt. 1 (1677-
1678), 1716, dec. 369 (20.5.1673), p. 428, n. 25; Wamesius, Responsorum sive Consiliorum (note 142), cent. 
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probably on the basis of maritime customs, the simple notoriety of the event was 
often deemed sufficient.163 The mishap had to be proven within one year from its 
occurrence.164 If the shipmaster was not able to prove the mishap within one year, the 
most obvious (non-culpable) reason was that he was dead. Hence, in the absence of 
news for a year and one day, a ship was customarily presumed lost.165 
 
The attestation of the court as to the nature of the mishap was not just important 
for the liability of the shipmaster towards the merchant who suffered some damage or 
loss, but also for the liability of other merchants both towards each other and in 
respect of the shipmaster himself. If the court pronounced for the fortuitous nature of 
the mishap, then anything done to limit the extent of the mishap was implicitly 
justified. Being justified, such actions could not give raise to contractual liability (of the 
shipmaster qua carrier) but at the most to equitable compensation. It is the case of 
general averages. General averages focus on the redistribution of the loss suffered 
while seeking to limit the damage that can be reasonably foreseen for vis maior.166 The 
typical example is jettison. To save both hull and part of the cargo during a tempest, it 
often happened that some merchandise were thrown overboard, thereby lightening 
                                                                          	
4, cons. 24, p. 64, n. 1 (undated, but on an insurance policy of December 1566). 
163 On the subject, some important decisions were rendered by the Florentine Civil Rota. Among them 
it suffices mentioning de Comitibus, Decisiones Inclitae Rotae Senensis et Florentinae (note 150), vol. 2, pt. 1, 
1725, dec. 61, pp. 5-6, n. 17-19, and Artimini, Raccolta delle Decisioni della Ruota Fiorentina dal 1700 al 1808 
(note 110), vol. 2, 1837, dec. 197 (28.1.1708), pp. 952-953, n. 17-19. Probably the clearest author on 
the point (not least because of his terse and succinct style) was a member of the Rota itself, the 
influential Ansaldo de Ansaldi (1651-1719), in his De Commercio et Mercatvra Discvrsvs Legales ... Romae, 
ex Typographia Dominici Antonij Herculis, 1689, disc. 70, p. 429, n. 16: “in hac materia ob locorum 
distantiam et celeritatem tristis euentus non solum admittantur Nautarum depositiones, sed etiam aliae 
probationes naturales publicae vocis, et famae, cum similibus, remota quacumque scrupolositate legis 
Ciuilis”. See further Scaccia, Tractatus de Commerciis et Cambio (note 109), § 1, q. 1, pp. 42-43, n. 158; 
Loccenius, De Jure Maritimo et Navali Libri Tres (note 107), lib. 3, cap. 11, p. 333, n. 7. 
164 Mascardi, Conclusiones Probationum Omnivm (note 25), vol. 3, concl. 1092, p. 214; Sacrae Rotae Romanae 
Decisionum Recentiorum a Joanne Baptista Compagno ... selectarum (note 150), vol. 19, pt. 1 (1677-1678), 1716, 
dec. 369 (20.5.1673), p. 428, n. 14; Sacrae Rotae Romanae Decisionum Recentiorum a Joanne Baptista Compagno 
... selectarum (note 150), vol. 19, n. 2 (1673-1683), 1716, dec. 447 (13.6.1674), p. 50, n. 2; Artimini, 
Raccolta delle Decisioni della Ruota Fiorentina dal 1700 al 1808 (note 110), vol. 2, 1837, dec. 197 (28.1.1708), 
p. 955, n. 24; Savelli, Summa Diversorum Tractatuum (note 65), vol. 1, lib. 1, s.v. Casus, p. 227, n. 6. 
165 See e.g. British Library, MSS Harleian 5103, art. 92, and Additional 48023 [art. 100] (both attesting 
the late-sixteenth century London customs); the Ordinances of the Burgos Consulate of 1538, ord. 67; 
the Ordinances of the Consulate of Bilbao of 1560, ord. 32; the famed Guidon de la Mer of Rouen 
(Gvidon, Stile et Vsance des Marchands Qvi mettent à la Mer, Roven, Mesgissier, 1619), cap. 7, p. 38; the 
Rotterdam Keur of 12.3.1604, s. 14; the Antwerp Compilatae of 1608, pt. 4, tit. 11, sec. 7, art. 245. See 
further Johann Van Niekerk, The Development of the Principles of Insurance Law in the Netherlands from 1500 to 
1800, Cape Town 1998, vol. 2, pp. 1030-1031. At the close of the middle ages, the length of this 
presumption is often attested as half the period – only six months. The first Ordinances to provide on 
the matter were those of Barcelona of 1452 (ord. 10); the same is provided in the Ordinances of the 
same city of 1458 and 1484 (ord. 22 and 23 respectively). The shift from the six-month to the one-year 
period is particularly clear with regard to Antwerp customs, as it is attested in Wamesius, Responsorum 
sive Consiliorum (note 142), cent. 4, dec. 24, n. 4, p. 65. Other insurance customs, such as the Florentine 
ones, continued to apply the six-month rule for a long time. 
166 Cf. G. Rossi, Insurance in Elizabethan England: The London Code, Cambridge 2016, pp. 137-140. 
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the ship. The owner of the merchandise thrown overboard was compensated by the 
others (both shipmaster and other merchants) by way of general average (often also 
called “gross” or “common” average, so as to distinguish it from “petty” ones – i.e. 
those damages not made to save the rest of the cargo and the ship).167 The same of 
course applied to the ship, for instance if her master decided to cut loose the anchor 
so to lighten the hull. In all such cases, the damage could be qualified as a general 
average only if the mishap was due to vis maior, and not to the behaviour of the 
shipmaster.  
This made the stance of law courts all the more important: the courts had both to 
decide on the occurrence of vis maior and also to pronounce on the causal link between 
that vis maior and the shipmaster’s conduct. As we have abundantly seen in these 
pages, a mishap may well be fortuitous in abstract terms, but still depend on the 
conduct of the shipmaster. Sailing towards a tempest is not the direct cause of the 
shipwreck (or of the jettison of part of the cargo to avoid as much), but it may well be 
considered as its precondition, and so culpa ad casum praeordinata. The problem of 
indirect causality, in other words, could well affect the qualification of a mishap – 
from fortuitous (and so, vis maior) to negligent, and even fraudulent. Thus, the role of 
law courts, and their increasing analysis of mishaps in terms of causality, had far-
reaching consequences both for sea-carriage law, insurance law, and general averages.  
 
3. The shipmaster’s liability in common law 
  
The early modern position of common law courts on the liability of the maritime 
carrier can perhaps be summed up more shortly, both because most records come 
from a single court - the King’s Bench168 - and because most scholarly works on the 
subject began to appear only at a later stage, particularly during the eighteenth century. 
As it is often the case, the interaction between courts and jurists so typical of early 
modern civil law (which sometimes means, the forest of legal treatises growing side by 
side with the collections of court decisions) is not nearly as pronounced in early 
modern common law. This makes our task somewhat easier, or at least shorter. 
 
3.1. Carriage, bailment and strict liability 
 
If the shipmaster’s liability in civil law was shaped after the liability of the conductor 
(although in the rather aggravated terms provided for nautae), in common law the 
starting point is the contract of bailment, from which carriage law stemmed. Looking 
at the main features of bailment, the civil lawyer might probably find some similarities 
with locatio-conductio, and others with depositum.169 As it happens, sometimes the 
                                                                          
167 Ibid., p. 138, text and note 7. 
168 The present article does not take into account records coming from the Admiralty. The reason is 
twofold. On the one hand, one of the main purposes of this work lies in comparing the approach of 
civil law and common law courts, and the Court of Admiralty did not follow the common law. On the 
other, and moreover, the jurisdiction of the Admiralty was increasingly restriced during the early 
modern period. Most cases on the liability of the carrier for damages or loss were not (or rather, no 
longer) within its remit.  
169 In effect, the list of possible Roman law contracts resembling one or another feature of bailment is 
longer (although not particularly sound): see esp. Coggs v Barnard (1703), 2 Raym. 909, 912-919 (per 
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practical outcome of a case was not particularly different between the two legal 
systems. So for instance in both common and civil law the carrier could not be held 
responsible (at least in principle) for the money hidden within the cargo unbeknownst 
to him.170 Equally, in both systems the carrier was under strict liability for anything 
received sealed but delivered open at destination.171 The similarities however fall short 
of the main issue – the standard of care. Unlike the carrier-conductor, the carrier-bailee 
was under strict liability. 
The reason for the strict liability of the bailee – and so, also of the carrier - derives 
from one of the many twists in the forms of pleading, which led bailment to acquire 
increasingly proprietary features, especially during the sixteenth century. Ultimately, 
this process depends on the conflation of the liability in trespass on the case (until the 
fifteenth century, of clear tortious nature) and in contract. The first was based on fault, 
the second was strict. These two approaches came to be both applicable for bailment. 
So long as the nature of the action on the case remained tortious, the two profiles 
could be kept distinct. At least, they would not collide in court: the form of action 
would determine the nature of the defendant’s liability. So if the (defendant whom we 
might consider in abstract terms as a) bailee was sued in an action upon the case, the 
                                                                          	
Holt CJKB). According to the terms of the bailment, the contract may be equiparated to: i. depositum, if 
the bailee keeps the bailed goods for the use of the bailor only; ii. commodatum, if the bailee enjoys the 
use of the bailed goods without payment; iii. locatio-conductio (or rather, locatio rei), if on the contrary the 
bailee has to pay for their use; iv. pignus, if the bailed goods are kept as pledge (though on the point 
Holt’s reasoning is somewhat wanting); vi. mandatum, if the bailee acts gratuitously upon commission of 
the bailor. In the case that interests us the most - the fifth one, that of the bailee as a carrier paid for 
his job - Holt does not venture in Roman law parallels (or at least the very accurate report of Raymond 
does not say as much). Holt describes the undertaking of the bailee in the same way as one would 
expect of the conductor in locatio operis, but with the (common law) twist of the division between public 
carriers and private individuals. Either for this reason or because the general scheme of locatio-conductio 
was already used for a different kind of bailment, Holt does not venture in Roman parallels for this 
kind of bailment. Cf. esp. D.J. Ibbetson (ed.), William Jones, An essay on the Law of Bailments, Bangor 
2004, pp. 98-102; J. Getzler, Duty of Care, in P. Burks and A. Pretto (eds.), Breach of Trust, Oxford 2002, 
pp. 41-74, at 46-50. 
170 See for instance a decision of the Piedmont Senate of 20.3.1613, reported by Thesauro, Quaestionvm 
Forensivm (note 15) lib. 3, q. 61, p. 49. In this case, a muleteer received some merchandise to transport, 
but in one of the parcels there were 300 duplae hidden. The merchandise were stolen and the muleteer 
was condemned to pay their value (since he was negligent in leaving them in the staple instead of 
storing them in his house), but he was not also condemned for the money. The same, at least in 
principle, applied in common law. For instance, a few years after the decision of the Piedmont Senate, 
in 1648 a dispute was heard by the King’s Bench. The plaintiff entrusted to the carrier a box, without 
telling him that there were a hundred pounds inside. The box was stolen, and the plaintiff sued the 
carrier for the whole amount. Although Roll CJKB instructed the jury not to consider the carrier 
responsible for the money, the jury gave a verdict for £97 all the same. The difference of £3 is easily 
explained: it was the carrier’s freight. Even the reporter, Aleyn, seems dismayed by the outcome - 
“quod durum videbatur circumstantibus”. Kenrig v Eggleston, Aleyn 93; 82 ER 932 (1648). See further 
e.g. R. Kaczorowski, The Common-Law Background of Nineteenth-Century Tort Law, LI (1990) Ohio State Law 
Journal, pp. 1127-1200, at 1139-1140. See however a brief but contrary statement in Morse v Slue (1672-
73), 3 Keb. 72, 135. 
171 E.g. Ferretti, De Iure, et Re Nauali (note 144), lib. 1, fol. 19v, n. 133; Titchburne v White (1718), 1 St. 
145; 93 Eng. Rep. 438. Cf. R. Kaczorowski (note 170), p. 1140; J. Pagan, English Carriers’ Common-Law 
Right to Reject Undeclared Cargo: The Myth of the Closed-Container Conundrum, XXIII (1982) William & Mary 
Law Review, pp. 791-833 at 807-808. 
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bench would qualify his liability as fault-based. If he was sued on, say, detinue, then he 
would be strictly liable. During the sixteenth century, however, the nature of the 
liability of the action on the case progressively changed, as the action on the case was 
increasingly applied for contractual non-performance. Gravitating towards contractual 
liability, the action on the case (especially in the predominant form of assumpsit) came 
to acquire the strict liability of contract. At this point, the different forms of action did 
not result in different standards of care on the bailee, not to mention that the 
procedural advantages for the plaintiff in suing on assumpsit (and the increasing 
propensity of the bench – especially the King’s Bench – to accept it for a variety of 
different situations) led to its widespread use for most situations involving bailment.172 
  
The increasingly proprietary features of bailment meant that the bailor was 
progressively allowed to bring a writ in the form of debet only for monetary 
obligations. For specific goods bailed, the writ had to take the form of detinet.173 The 
point is important, because if the bailor’s allegation was detinet, then the bailee’s 
defence had to be shaped as non detinet.174 If the bailee did receive the thing but lost or 
damaged it for reasons not imputable to him – chiefly, vis maior - it would be 
considerably easier for him to shape his counter-pleading in the form of non debet. The 
moment this was no longer allowed, strict liability began to creep in the picture – 
whether or not the outcome was deliberate. 
This could already be seen in the mid-fifteenth century with Marshal’s case (1455), a 
landmark case on the liability of the bailee in case of accident,175 which would 
ultimately have important repercussions on the scope of the shipmaster’s liability for 
vis maior. The prisoner of a galoer (the galoer of the Marshalsea prison - that is, the 
marshal of the King’s Bench) was freed by a mob. As the galoer’s obligation was 
construed in terms of bailment, his position was that of a bailee. In principle, the 
galoer-bailee had recourse against English subjects who broke into the prison (for they 
were subjected to English jurisdiction), but not against enemies of the king (for they 
lay outside the boundaries of English jurisdiction). As the bailee had recourse against 
an armed mob but not against enemies, he was liable in case of robbery but not of 
enemy attack. Hence, and much unlike in civil law, the carrier could not invoke vis 
maior in case of robbery.  
In 1601 Southcote v Bennet strengthened the strict liability of the bailee: to keep and 
to keep safely, it was held, are one and the same thing.176 The bailee was strictly liable 
(the issue was theft) not just if he specially warranted to keep the goods at his own 
                                                                          
172 For a detailed reconstruction of this process see D.J. Ibbetson (note 169), pp. 74-95. 
173 D.J. Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations, Oxford 1999, p.35 
174 S.F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law (2nd edn.), Oxford 1981, pp. 262-263 and 
268. 
175 YB Hil. 33 Hy. VI, p. 3, f. 1: see S.F.C. Milsom (note 174), p. 268; O.W. Holmes, Common Carriers 
and the Common Law, III (1879) American Law Review, pp. 609-631 at 611-612; D.J. Ibbetson, Fault and 
absolute liability in pre modern contract law, XVIII (1997) Journal of Legal History, pp. 1-31 at 13-14. 
176 4 Co. Rep. 83b; Cro. Eliz. 815. On this landmark case see e.g. D.J. Ibbetson, An essay on the Law of 
Bailments (note 169), pp.90-91; Id., Fault and absolute liability (note 175), pp. 17-18; On the different 
reports of this case see J. Pagan (note 171), p. 803, note 47, where vast literature. 
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peril, but unless he explicitly excluded as much.177 The most likely reason for this - 
otherwise curious - association between keeping and keeping safely probably lies in 
that both kinds of undertaking were oral (as it is well known, at common law a written 
contract needed a sealed bond), and so juries might have found rather difficult to 
distinguish between them.178 After Southcote’s case the strict liability of the bailee 
became consolidated,179 and subsequent case law did not add much to the point.180  
While further decisions proved that the rule in Southcote’s case was not necessarily 
as draconian as it might appear,181 when applied to a maritime context, however, it 
was. A pivotal case in this respect was Morse v Slue (1672-73).182 A ship bound to Cadiz 
was still mooring on the Thames when part of the cargo got stolen. The ship was 
remarkably well watched, and no fault whatsoever could be found against her master. 
Relying on Southcote’s case, the plaintiff insisted that the shipmaster is a public carrier 
                                                                          
177 This way, Southcote’s case might have inverted the logic of some previous cases, especially Mosley v 
Fosset (1598), Moo. 543, which established that the bailee is answerable for theft only with a “special 
assumpsit” (i.e. specific undertaking to vouch for the thing). To what extent did Mosley v Fosset amount 
to fault-based liability in practice, however, is hard to say, since the bench might have been inclined to 
agree to infer such a “special assumpsit” from the presence of consideration: if the bailee was paid for 
keeping the goods, then he would be answerable for theft. The case however was discontinued, with 
the consent of the plaintiff, after Michaelmas 1600: D.J. Ibbetson, An essay on the Law of Bailments (note 
169), p. 89, note 68.  
178 D.J. Ibbetson, Coggs v Barnard, in C. Mitchell and P. Mitchell (eds.), Landmark Cases in the Law of 
Contract, Oxford 2008, pp. 1-22 at 8. The old explanation of Beale, that the judgment for the plaintiff 
was only provisional, does not appear convincing – and indeed is nowadays not even taken much into 
account. Beale thought that the judgment was given “nisi aliquid dicatur in contrario die veneris 
proximo”. On the basis of the 3rd edition of Raymond’s Reports (2 Raym. 911n), Beale then argued 
that says that the final judgment was entered in favour of the defendant. J. Beale, Carrier’s Liability: Its 
History, XI (1897) Harvard Law Review, pp. 158-168 at 162. Cf. Id., Southcott v. Bennett. Queen’s Bench, 
Pasch. 43 Eliz. (1601), XIII (1899) Harvard Law Review, pp. 43-47 at 45-47. For Beale, the strict liability 
of the carrier was only a later development, taking place under Mansfield CJKB (Beale, Carrier’s 
Liability, loc. cit., pp. 162-163). Apart from being rather speculative and ignoring several other cases 
taking place before Mansfield himself, the thesis could hardly explain why at the eve of the eighteenth 
century did Holt CJKB take so much pain in detaching himself from Southcote’s case in order to insist 
on the fault-based liability of the non-professional carrier in Coggs v Barnard (discussed in the main 
text). As Holt saw it, the main obstacle to avoid the strict liability of any carrier – whether or not 
professional – was precisely the strict liability imposed by Southcote’s case. 
179 See esp. Rich v Kneeland (1613), Hob. 17; more accurately Cro. Jac. 330 (discussing whether the 
plaintiff’s assent as to the delivery was material, but in effect focusing on whether a common 
bargeman was under strict liability without special promise). Cf. Robinson v Dunmore, 2 Bos. & Pul. 417. 
180 Except perhaps that when the bailee was a professional carrier there was no need to show 
consideration (for that was presumed): see esp. Nicholls v More (1661) 82 ER 954. Cf. D.J. Ibbetson, 
Coggs v Barnard (note 178), p. 17. This last point may be contrasted with what said for the civil law 
liability of the carrier (with the exclusion of the sea-carrier), who may be saddled with culpa levissima 
only if he both expressly vouched to keep the thing safe and received extra payment for that: supra, text 
and note 52. 
181 See esp. Williams v Hide (1628), Palm. 548. In that case the bailed horse was dead, and the King’s 
Bench found for the bailee. That however did not amount to full denial of his strict liability – had the 
horse been stolen, even in a robbery, the bailee would have likely been charged with the loss. 
182 2 Lev. 69; 2 Keb. 866; S.C. Raym. 220; 1 Mod. 85; 1 Vent. 190, 238; 3 Keb. 72, 112, 135; 1 Danv. 
12; 1 Roll. Abr. 2, pl. 2, 3; Cro. Jac. 262, 330; 1 Sid. 36, 245. The importance of the case warrants 
looking at several different reports, none of which, alone, seems to provide a full picture. 
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and, as bailee, he is under strict liability.183 The main defence of the shipmaster 
amounted to insisting on his fault-based standard of care: in maritime law, he claimed, 
there is only an action on “wilful neglect” (which of course he denied).184 Further, the 
defendant insisted, the shipmaster should be considered as the shipowner’s servant. 
The merchant therefore would have no action against him, but only against the 
shipowner.185 The bench agreed that the shipmaster is not liable for vis maior (not even 
in presence of a special undertaking). Nonetheless, as we have seen, robbery did not 
amount to vis maior. Moreover, the bench held, a shipmaster is far from being an 
ordinary servant: he is more alike to a “goaler, who is chargeable for escapes”. The 
reference to the Marshal’s case is clear: indeed, continued the bench, neither theft nor 
robbery could be invoked to lift the shipmaster’s liability, “unless in case of common 
enemies” (i.e. enemies of the king).186 An important element, that we will see also in 
other landmark cases on our subject, is that the strict liability of the shipmaster as 
carrier (and so, ultimately, as bailee) is affirmed in practice but not stated in general 
terms. The language of the pleading is still framed in terms of fault. So for instance the 
bench observed that, although the ship was guarded, considering both the specific 
merchandise loaded onboard and the dangers that could materialise in such a 
dangerous place, the number of guards should have been higher.187 This language 
would seem to imply negligence. However, the court continued, “if the carrier is 
robbed by a hundred men, he is never the more excused.”188 Similarly, if we look at 
the treatise of Charles Molloy (first published in 1676, and so three years after Morse’s 
case), the author introduces the shipmaster’s liability observing how “the Law looks 
upon him as an Officer, who must render and give an account for the whole charge 
when once committed to his care and custody, and upon failer to render satisfaction, 
and therefore if misfortunes happens, if they be either through negligence, wilfulness, 
or ignorance of himself or his Mariners, he must be responsible”.189 While there was 
                                                                          
183 See esp. 3 Keb. 72, 112-113. The plaintiff further referred to the status of public officer of the 
shipmaster (who “hath his office by publick law not by a private command”), although on somewhat 
questionable basis. The plaintiff referred especially to the Safe Conducts Act of 1414 (2 Hen. 5, c. 6), 
providing for the establishment of the office of Conservator, who had to ensure the shipmasters’ 
compliance with the safe conducts for any prize taken. The shipmaster had to come back to the port 
after taking any prize, unless forced to go elsewhere by storm, wind or enemies “Force of Wind, 
Tempest, or of Enemies” (ibid.) - incidentally, the same causes exonerating the carrier. The statute was 
however suspended in 1435 (14 Hen. 6, c. 8), and then repealed a few years thereafter (20 Hen. 6, 
c.11). Cf. Statutes of the Realm, vol. 2, pp. 178-181, 294 and 323 respectively.  
184 1 Vent. 190, and esp. 3 Keb. 113, 113-114.  
185 3 Keb. 113-114. The reference to the shipowner was also used to insist that the merchant cannot be 
in a better position towards the shipmaster (insisting on the latter’s strict liability) than the shipowner is 
for the ship’s furniture (for which the shipmaster is liable only for negligence). The bench replied that 
the shipmaster is not a mere servant, and that the merchant has a direct action against him. On the 
subject see further esp. Ellis v Turner (1800), 101 ER 1529. 
186 1 Vent. 238-239; 3 Keb. 135. 1 Mod. 86 and 2 Lev. 68 are less specific (the latter in particular 
provides just a short summary). 
187 See esp. 1 Ventr. 239. 
188 Ibid. 
189 Charles Molloy (1646-1690), De Jure Maritimo et Navali, London, Printed for John Bellinger ... 
George Dawes ... and Robert Boulter Bellinger, 1676, lib. 2, cap. 2, p. 197. 
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little doubt as to the strict nature of the master’s liability,190 the language used was still 
framed in terms of culpa. 
The same ambiguity may be found in one of the – few – cases where the 
shipmaster was excused, Jefferyes v Legendra (1690). A ship leaving from London to 
Naples was supposed to sail in a convoy, but soon thereafter the force of wind 
separated her from the other vessels. This resulted in her capture at the hand of the 
French. While the actual loss was due to the enemies of the king, the event depended 
on the ship’s departure from the convoy. The question was therefore whether the 
shipmaster was liable for that. Winds clearly fall beyond human control, so the master 
was eventually discharged. But in agreeing with Hold CJKB, the puisne judges 
remarked how the master had done his outmost in the circumstances, and therefore it 
was not his fault if the ship had lost the convoy.191 Thus, if both in condemning and in 
absolving the carrier the bench was seemingly speaking in terms of fault, at the basis 
of its decisions there was strict liability, which could be avoided only in case of vis 
maior. 
 
3.2. Common carriers and culpa levissima  
 
At first sight, the use of fault language in a strict liability scenario might seem to 
have been encouraged by the similarity with the civilian tradition, especially the culpa 
levissima of the shipmaster. In fact that was a similarity found ex post, which entailed no 
influence of civil law ideas on a substantive level. 
Let us take for instance the landmark case of Coggs v Barnard (1703).192 On the face 
of it, the case was rather banal: a land carrier agreed to move a barrel of brandy for the 
plaintiff from a cellar to another in London but spilt most of its content. After that 
the jury found for the plaintiff, the defendant raised a motion in arrest of judgment, 
on the basis of both the plaintiff’s lack of proof as to consideration193 and, crucially, 
the nature of his liability - which, the defendant alleged, was not strict but based on 
negligence.194 What makes important this case is that the bench (especially, it would 
seem, the puisne judges) agreed that the rule in Southcote’s case (i.e. the strict liability of 
the bailee) was too harsh. The judges therefore sought to depart from the previous 
and, by then, well established position. They did so by distinguishing between private 
and public (or common) carrier:195 only the latter should be saddled with strict liability. 
                                                                          
190 Indeed, continues Molloy, “he that is Exercitor Navis must answer the damage, for that the very 
lading of the goods aboard the Ship does Subject the Master to answer the same” (ibid., emphasis in 
the text). 
191 3 Lev. 320, Salk. 443, 4 Mod. 58, and esp. Show 320. 
192 2 Raym. 909, 2 Salk. 735. See esp. D.J. Ibbetson, Coggs v Barnard (note 178), pp. 1-22, and Id., An 
essay on the Law of Bailments (note 169), pp. 95-103. 
193 One of the issues in the case was whether the carrier was a professional one or not: only if he was 
could consideration be presumed. 
194 D.J. Ibbetson, Coggs v Barnard (note 178), pp. 3-4. The complex and important reasoning of Holt 
CJKB may be read in William Jones, An Essay on the Law of Bailments, Philadelphia, Hogan and 
Thompson, 1836, Appendix, pp. 113-126. 
195 On the distinction between or public and private carriers and, especially, their different liability see 
J. Oldham, English common law in the age of Mansfield, Chapel Hill 2004, pp. 283-287. 
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Stressing the difference between “lay” bailee and professional carrier, the bench 
justified the fault-based liability of the former at the price of reaffirming the strict 
liability of the latter. To that end, the culpa levissima of the nautae was highlighted 
(especially by Holt CJKB) and, with it, the old “presumption of dishonesty” of the 
professional carrier - especially the shipmaster.196 The Roman triad nautae caupones 
stabularii, however, was not invoked to bring the position of public carriers at common 
law closer to Roman law. Rather, the parallel was drawn only to loosen the stringent 
standard of care for non-professional carriers, and so to reconcile the dichotomy 
between contractual (strict liability) and tortious (fault-based) approaches to 
bailment.197  
The bench’s reliance on the culpa levissima of the nautae in Coggs v Barnard is hardly 
an isolated case. Similar references abound in early modern English case law, especially 
to justify the hardening of the bailee’s liability in a maritime context. An instance 
where that is particularly evident is the coeval case of Lane v Cotton (1701), where the 
rationale for the strict liability of the shipmaster is explained, again, as deriving from 
the old presumption of dishonesty that informed the medieval civilians’ approach to 
the subject.198 Moving forward of a few decades, another significant case is Dale v Hall 
(1750). There, a plaintiff was able to move for new trial because the judge allowed the 
shipmaster to give evidence that he had done all that could be done to avoid the 
damage.199 “A promise to carry safely, is a promise to keep safely,” concluded Lee 
CJKB ruling against the admissibility of the evidence for the shipmaster.200 The bench 
                                                                          
196 As Holt CJKB put it, the (professional) carrier was bound “to carry goods, against all events but 
acts of God and of the enemies of the King. For though the force be never so great, as if an irresistible 
multitude of people should rob him, nevertheless he is chargeable … for else these carriers might have 
an opportunity of undoing all persons that had any dealings with them, by combining with thieves etc. 
and yet doing it in such a clandestine manner, as would not be possible to be discovered. And this is 
the reason the law is founded upon in that point” (2 Raym. 909, 918). Cf. Jones, An Essay on the Law of 
Bailments (note 194), Appendix, pp. 113-126. 
197 The true influence of Roman law seems to have been not on the carrier’s liability, but on that of the 
normal bailee undertaking to do something (as in the present case) without consideration. The Roman 
contractual scheme invoked by Holt CJKB was that of mandatum, but its standard of liability was clearly 
different (and much lower) than that applicable in common law. The high judge however was able to 
mediate his reliance on Roman law through a pillar of the common law of old, Bracton (whose views 
on the point were substantially the same as those in Justinian’s Institutes), stressing further how, 
despite the antiquity of the source, Bracton’s (i.e. Justinian’s) position was in accordance with natural 
reason. Cf. D.J. Ibbetson, Coggs v Barnard (note 178), pp. 18-20. 
198 “And though one may think it a hard case that a poor carrier who is robbed on the road, without 
any manner of default in him, should be answerable for all the goods he takes, yet the inconveniency 
would be far more intolerable if it were not so, for it would be in his power to combine with robbers, 
or to pretend a robbery or some other accident, without a possibility of remedy to the party; and the 
law will not expose him to so great a temptation, but he must be honest at his peril. And this is the 
reason of the civil law in this case, which though I am loth to quote, yet inasmuch as the laws of all 
nations are doubtless raised out of the ruins of the civil law … it must be owned that the principles of 
our law are borrowed from the civil law, therefore grounded upon the same reason in many things” 
(12 Mod. 472, 482, per Holt CJKB). The point is probably even clearer in Salk. 17, 18: “it is a hard 
thing to charge a carrier; but if he should not be charged, he might keep a correspondence with 
thieves, and cheat the owner of his goods, and he should never be able to prove it.”  
199 1 Wils. K.B. 281; 95 ER 619. Cf. J. Oldham (note 195), pp. 286-287. 
200 1 Wils. K.B. 281, 282. 
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did not say openly that the shipmaster was under strict liability, but made sure to leave 
no alternative. Yet, again, the language used was framed in terms of negligence. So, as 
William Selwyn (1775-1855) put it when commenting on this case, “whatever was not 
excused by law, was to be deemed a negligence in the carrier”.201  
Despite the tendency of some Continental scholars to derive the common law 
position from the civil one,202 however, the actual link would seem rather weak. As it 
happens with the overwhelming majority of references to civil law in early modern 
common law, that was an ex post parallel, where civil law was merely invoked to 
strengthen the intellectual position of English law, not to provide a legal (or just 
logical) basis for it. It does not seem fortuitous that, in the period when bailment was 
increasingly drifting towards strict liability, the same parallel with civil law was made 
by Christopher St German (1460-1540) in his Doctor and Student. But St German did so 
for the very opposite reason: to make the bailee (just as any other consignee) 
responsible only for his fault.203  
A rather emblematic instance where the liability of the shipmaster was established 
despite the clear absence of any responsibility (in causal terms) for the mishap is 
Forward v Pittard (1785), a case of an accidental fire onboard that could not be ascribed 
in any way to the shipmaster. The counsel for the plaintiff relied on what Holt CJKB 
said in Coggs v Barnard to make a simple point: the (common) carrier is a kind of bailee 
saddled with strict liability. More interesting is the position of the counsel for the 
defendant: he recalled other decisions,204 framed in the language of fault, to insist that 
the shipmaster’s liability is based on negligence.205 The bench, needless to say, found 
for the plaintiff. The defendant, it should be noted, had a point: the language used in 
previous decisions was indeed framed in terms of negligence. Nonetheless, the 
rationale of those decisions was clearly based on strict liability. Whether the language 
employed by the court was of strict liability or or fault, therefore, it counted for little. 
The valiant attempts of the defendant to insist that the act of God - which would 
clearly fall beyond the scope of the carrier’s liability - is not limited to very specific 
cases but could be invoked for any mishap lying outside the carrier’s control did not 
persuade much the bench, nor did it help the parallel with the civil law (a parallel 
implying that culpa levissima was still a fault-based standard). The famous statement of 
Mansfield CJKB in that case left little margin to discussion: “A carrier is in the nature 
of an insurer.”206 It is precisely because of such insurer-like nature that the carrier is 
                                                                          
201 William Selwyn, An Abridgement of the Law of Nisi Prius (4th edn.), London, printed for W. Clarke and 
Sons, 1817, p. 380.  
202 E.g. R. Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations (note 32), p. 524, and H. Wicke, Respondeat Superior. 
Haftung für Verrichtungsgehilfen im römischen, römisch-höllandischen, englishen und südafrikanischen Recht, Berlin 
2000, pp. 175-176 (the first author relying especially on Lane v Cotton, the second on Coggs v Barnard). 
203 Christopher St German, The Dialogue in English, betweene and Doctor of Divinity and a Student in the Laws 
of England, London, printed by the Assignes of John More, 1638, lib. 2, cap. 38, fols. 129r-130r (St 
German’s Dialogue was originally written around 1530). Cf. D.J. Ibbetson, Coggs v Barnard (note 178), p. 
8. It does not seem fortuitous that St German’s Dialogue was one of the main arguments invoked by 
the shipmaster in Morse v Slue, 3 Keb. 72, 114. 
204 In particular Rich v Kneeland, supra, note 179. 
205 1 T.R. 27, 29-32. 
206 Ibid., 33-34. 
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answerable beyond his negligence - and so, for strict liability. The only exceptions to 
such strict liability are those events beyond human control.207 The liability of the 
shipmaster was therefore affirmed on the basis that the fire onboard did not arise 
from a lightning, and so it could not be considered as an event beyond human 
control.208 In the eyes of a civil lawyer, Mansfield’s list of events triggering vis maior 
might appear a little puzzling: the king’s enemies were listed together with natural 
events,209 whereas robbery was left outside. In fact, both the association between 
natural events and king’s enemies and the exclusion of robbery may be explained 
thinking of the formation of this doctrine, going back to the already mentioned 
Marshal’s case. Similarly, the year before Forward v Pittard, the same Mansfield found 
against the shipmaster whose vessel was attacked by robbers on the Thames. Clearly 
the carrier could not resist to them, and yet that was not sufficient as to exonerate him 
- they were not enemies of the king. Dura lex sed lex, concluded Mansfield.210  
Mansfield’s restatement of the carrier’s liability, especially in Forward v Pittard, 
clarified the bottom line, moving away from the traditional fault language and pointing 
straight to strict liability. But it did not add much in substantive terms. The boundaries 
of the shipmaster’s liability remained those set by Southcote’s case. Neither did the law 
allow the carrier to set the terms in which he would carry. This possibility 
(theoretically still allowed in earlier times for bailment in general - suffices to think of 
Southcote itself) was probably excluded - at the very latest - with Coggs v Barnard. As a 
result, the carrier was also denied the possibility of lowering his standard of care even 
by specific agreement. This prohibition continued well into modern times. So for 
instance, in Harris v Packwood (1810) the bench set aside the waiver of liability, agreed 
                                                                          
207 Ibid., 33: “It appears from all the cases for 100 years back, that there are events for which the carrier 
is liable independent of his contract. [...] there is a further degree of responsibility by the custom of the 
realm, that is, by the common law; a carrier is in the nature of an insurer. It is laid down that he is liable 
for every accident, except by the act of God, or the King’s enemies. ... [T]o prevent litigation, 
collusion, and the necessity of going into circumstances impossible to be unravelled, the law presumes 
against the carrier, unless he shews it was done by the King’s enemies, or by such act as could not 
happen by the intervention of man, as storms, lightning, and tempests” (emphasis in the text). 
Although the point is not often to be found in English case law, it is clear that a natural event cannot 
be invoked to discharge the shipmaster, where he put himself in the condition to suffer from it. Cf. e.g. 
Williams v Grant, 1 Conn. Reptr. 487. The earliest work where I could find the point clearly explained is 
the Appendix to the first American edition of Jones’ Essay on the Law of Bailments (note 194), pp. 20-21. 
See further J. Oldham (note 195), pp. 287-288. 
208 1 T.R. 27, 34: “In this case, it does not appear but that the fire arose from the act of some man or 
other. It certainly did arise from some act of man; for it is expressly stated not to have happened by 
lightning. The carrier therefore in this case is liable, inasmuch as he is liable for inevitable accident.” 
209 Cf. e.g. J. Beale, Carrier’s Liability (note 178), pp. 168-169. 
210 “At first the rule appears to be hard, but it is settled on principles of policy, and, when established, 
every man contracts with reference to it, and there is no hardship at all”, Barclay v Cuculla y Gana 
(1784), 3 Doug. 389. The outcome is no different if the damage derives from a third party, without any 
possible contributory negligence of the carrier. The same year as Forward v Pittard, for instance, the 
same Mansfield CJKB found against the carrier despite that the collision was due to an anchor not 
fastened to a buoy - and so, not visible. It may be noted that the marine custom was to sail between 
anchor and vessel, because going around was considered more dangerous. So the shipmaster did 
exactly what he was supposed to do. And the damage was not foreseable, neither was it avoidable. The 
Company of the Proprietors of the Navigation from the Trent to the Mersey v Wood, 4 Doug. 286; 99 ER 884 
(1785). 
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between the parties, on items beyond a certain value.211 Similarly inadmissible was 
found the shipmaster’s express notice to limit the scope of his liability, because that 
would clash with his responsibility as common carrier. So, in Lyon v Mells (1804) the 
shipmaster was found liable to pay in full for the loss, despite the fact that the charter-
party clearly warned the merchant consignor of the poor conditions of the vessel, for 
which the shipmaster declined responsibility.212  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Despite the the insistence of common law courts (in effect, mostly of the King’s 
Bench) on the similarity between the carrier’s liability in England and the culpa levissima 
of the civilians, the position of the two legal systems was different, in two fundamental 
ways. First, as to the standard of care expected of the shipmaster. In England, the 
shipmaster was saddled with strict liability – so strict, indeed, that it went even beyond 
the Roman law custodia. On the Continent (especially the Italian and Iberian 
peninsulae), the shipmaster was under culpa levissima, interpreted as a very high – but in 
principle fault-based - standard of care. Only in some specific cases did that standard 
of care entail the inversion of the burden of proof. Secondly, and crucially, the 
difference between the two approaches also encompassed causation. The almost 
absolute liability of the master in England normally dispensed with issues of causation. 
By contrast, the emphasis of civil law judges on the need of direct causation between 
master’s conduct and mishap shifted the focus from fault to causation. Since most of 
the legal presumptions on sea-carriers were based on the kind of mishap, fault (or, at 
least, fault leading to the mishap - culpa causam dans) depended on the specific way in 
which the ship and her cargo were damaged or lost. Although rebuttable in principle, 
only seldom did a court detach itself from such presumptions - and so, from a 
predetermined outcome. Thus, most of the times liability was allocated on the basis of 
a rigid application of abstract causality schemes. The distinction between culpa levis and 
culpa levissima continued to apply, but it was increasingly an ex post explanation for a 
rather different mechanism. When applicable, culpa levissima amounted to the inversion 
of the burden of proof. The reason, however, was not that the standard was higher 
than culpa levis, but that the specific case before the court fell within a specific 
presumption of causality. By contrast, where the mishap was presumptively qualified 
as fortuitous, or it did not fall in either group of presumptions, then the approach of 
the courts was substantially the same as culpa levis (regardless of the aggravated liability 
theoretically applied to the shipmaster). In both cases it was the kind of mishap to 
determine the actual standard of care expected of the shipmaster. 
If it is very rare to find a Mansfield among coeval Italian judges, that is hardly due 
to the inferior quality or learning of Continental courts. It is largely the consequence 
of the increasingly ossified structure of the decision-making process. The unspoken 
truth (sometimes masked under the stereotype of a stale, late mos italicus) is that early 
modern civil law courts were often tied (or rather tied themselves) to their precedents 
considerably more than common law courts. In such an environment, the grip of an 
                                                                          
211 3 Taunt. 264, per Laurence J. 
212 5 East 428; 102 ER 1134, per Ellenborough CJKB. 
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unflexible tradition (or rather, the hardening of the stylus curiae into semi-binding 
precedents) became increasingly difficult to avoid, and abstract presumptions 
progressively harder to disprove.  
